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The Transformation of Originality  
in the Progressive-Era Debate over Copyright in News 
 
Robert Brauneis∗  
 
 In 1991, a unanimous Supreme Court declared in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural 
Telephone Service Co., Inc.1 that only those aspects of works which demonstrated a “modicum 
of creativity”2 would be copyrightable.  It thus excluded factual representations, which were not 
“created” but merely “cop[ied] . . . from the world,”3 from copyright protection.  That declaration 
of a bedrock principle of copyright confirmed and extended the unanimous view of an otherwise 
split Supreme Court in the 1918 case of International News Service v. Associated Press.4 
Majority and dissenting opinions in INS all expressed the view that information about current 
events – news – was not copyrightable apart from its literary form.5  Yet for the first three-
quarters of the nineteenth century, the notion that copyright incorporated an originality 
requirement which excluded factual matter from protection was unknown to Anglo-American 
law.  Courts routinely found infringement of fact-based works, such as maps, charts, road-books, 
directories, and calendars, on the basis of the copying of their factual content, and concluded that 
the industry of plaintiffs in gathering and presenting facts – their “intellectual labor” -- should be 
protected under copyright law.6  What caused the transformation in conceptions of originality 
between the Civil War and World War I?  
 
This article argues that the rise of creativity-based originality in copyright law has strong 
ties to a previously little-examined episode in copyright history: the debate over legal protection 
for news in the last decades of the nineteenth century.  Until the 1880s, the American news 
industry remained in a pre-copyright era, and played no part in copyright discourse.  Most 
newspapers were partisan organs that sought financial support at least as much from political 
sponsors as from sales or advertising.  Newspaper editors followed a widespread custom of 
freely copying text from other newspapers.  That custom was acknowledged and encouraged by 
a massive government subsidy in the form of free postage for newspaper copies that were being 
                                                 
∗ Associate Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Intellectual Property Law Program, The George Washington 
University Law School; Member, Managing Board, Munich Intellectual Property Law Center.  I would like to thank 
the participants in the September 28, 2007 Symposium on “Feist, Facts, and Functions: IP Protection for Works 
Beyond Entertainment,” co-sponsored by the Intellectual Property Law Program of The George Washington 
University Law School and the Software and Information Industry Association. For assistance in retrieving petitions 
and other original documents relating to the news copyright bills of 1884, I would like to thank Rod Ross and 
William Davis of the Center for Legislative Archives, National Records and Archives Administration.  For 
assistance in locating the briefs of the parties in National Tel. News Co. v. Western Union Co., 119 F. 294 (7th Cir. 
1902), I would like to thank the staff of the Chicago office of the National Archives and Records Administration, 
Great Lakes Region.  For comments on drafts of this piece, I would like to thank Ellen Goodman, Michael Carroll, 
Dawn Nunziato, Lionel Bently, Robert Burrell, the students in my Fall 2008 IP History seminar, and the participants 
in the October 2008 WIP IP Conference at Tulane University Law School and in the faculty works-in-progress 
series at The George Washington University Law School. 
1 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
2 499 U.S. at 362. 
3 Id. at 347. 
4 248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
5 For a discussion of the majority and dissenting opinions in the International News Service case, see notes 181-187 
and accompanying text below. 
6 See infra notes 22-60 and accompanying text. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1365366
 2
exchanged between editors.  Newspaper owners never registered their papers before publication, 
and thus forsook copyright protection for them.   
 
In the middle decades of 1800s, however, social and technological changes radically 
changed the structure of the news industry.  Political subsidies for newspapers shrank, and 
newspapers became more heavily dependent on sales and advertising.  The introduction of the 
telegraph provided newspapers with an opportunity to invest in more timely news; yet together 
with improvements in typesetting, printing, and transportation technology, the telegraph also 
created an appropriability problem.  It shrank the lead-time advantage that newspapers 
traditionally had relied upon to realize the value of their investment in news, and also exposed 
them to competition from which they had previously been geographically isolated.  At the same 
time, the new communications technologies led to the emergence of companies and large 
associations that dominated markets, often with the aid of anti-competitive practices.  Prominent 
among these were the news industry organizations of the Associated Press and the Western 
Union.   
 
Within this context, the Associated Press, Western Union and others began in the 1880s 
to press for legal protection of news reports, in both legislative and judicial arenas.  On the 
legislative front, the Associated Press backed an 1884 effort to amend the Copyright Act to 
provide protection for news items. Opposition to that effort led to the first prominent 
articulations of the notion that facts are not created by authors, and are therefore not 
copyrightable subject matter. After that effort failed, the Associated Press and others turned to 
the courts.  Paradoxically, their efforts to seek judicial protection for news ended up reinforcing 
the creativity-based view of originality, because they resolved for strategic reasons to seek 
protection outside of federal copyright law, in common law misappropriation, and decided to 
argue that news was not copyrightable in order to avoid copyright preemption of their common 
law claims. 
 
Part I of this article sets the stage by briefly considering existing accounts of the rise of 
creativity-based originality in American law.  Part II reviews the intellectual-labor-based model 
of originality that dominated Anglo-American copyright law in the nineteenth century, and 
places it in the context of other copyright doctrine of the time.  Part III first describes the 
structure of the American news industry up through the mid-nineteenth century, and explains 
why that industry operated entirely independently of copyright; in then considers the changes in 
news industry structure caused by the telegraph and other new technologies, and explains how 
those changes led the some industry elements to push for legal protection for news.  Part IV 
follows the legislative and judicial campaign for legal protection for news, and traces the 
development of creativity-based originality rhetoric on both sides of that campaign.  Part V 
draws some conclusions about the broader history of copyright doctrine from this episode.     
 
I.  Do Existing Accounts Explain the Rise of Creativity-Based Originality in 
American Law?  Mark Rose, Martha Woodmansee, Peter Jaszi and others7 have noted the 
                                                 
7  See, e.g., Mark Rose, Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright 113- 129 (1993); Martha Woodmansee, 
The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the “Author,” 17 Eighteenth-
Century Std. 425 (1984); Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of  “Authorship,” 1991 
Duke L. J. 455. 
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relationship between the creativity-based view of originality and the ideology of the “romantic 
author” – the notion that the writer is not merely a craftsman, but “a unique individual uniquely 
responsible for a unique product.”8  The connections between “romantic author” ideology and 
the legal rights of authors, however, were explored in the mid- to late-eighteenth century in both 
Germany9 and England.10  Much of the English exploration was in connection with two cases – 
Millar v. Taylor11 and Donaldson v. Becket12 – that at least by 1834 were extremely well-known 
in American legal circles, because Wheaton v. Peters,13 the momentous first copyright decision 
of the U.S. Supreme Court, concerned similar issues and occasioned frequent references to 
Millar and Donaldson by litigants and Justices alike.  Yet, as will be detailed below in Part II,14 
none of these debates had any significant influence on the concept of originality in American 
copyright law before the Civil War.  Rather, courts continued to consider works to be original 
and copyrightable if they were created through the application of independent intellectual labor, 
even if that labor involved gathering and representing facts rather than expressing anything 
unique to an author. 
 
Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 
Inc.15 has focused attention on two Supreme Court cases decided, respectively, in 1879 and 
1885: the Trade-Mark Cases16 and Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony.17  For Justice 
O’Connor, the Trade-Mark Cases and Burrow-Giles were the first two cases in which the 
Supreme Court addressed originality, and articulated from the very beginning exactly same view 
that Feist itself adopts: that the originality requirement precludes any copyright protection for 
bare representations of fact, because such representations do not exhibit the creativity required 
by both the Copyright Act and the Constitution.  If these cases were indeed the crucial turning 
points in the treatment of originality in American copyright law, one could argue that the concept 
of originality evolved because the Supreme Court had to confront for the first time the issues 
raised by these two cases: respectively, whether the federal constitution empowered Congress to 
regulate trademarks, and whether it empowered Congress to grant copyright protection to 
photographs. 
 
This article does not seek to prove that the Trade-Mark Cases and Burrow-Giles have no 
place in a history of evolving concepts of originality in U.S. copyright law.  It does seek to 
suggest, however, that those cases do not express and implement a change in conception of 
originality nearly as clearly as it would appear from their treatment in Feist, and that it is 
therefore possible that another factor made a major contribution to that change.  As for the 
Trade-Mark Cases, the language in Justice Miller’s opinion for the Court, passages of which are 
quoted and paraphrased in Feist, is much more equivocal than might at first appear through 
modern eyes.  When Justice Miller seeks to identify those ingredients that distinguish copyrights 
                                                 
8 Woodmansee, supra  n. 7, at 429. 
9 See id. at 431-448. 
10 See Rose, supra note 7, at 92-112. 
11 4 Burr 2303, 98 E.R. 201 (1769). 
12 4 Burr 2408, 98 E.R. 257; 2 Bro PC 129, 1 E.R. 837 (1774). 
13 33 U.S. 591 (1834). 
14 See infra notes 22-60 and accompanying text. 
15 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
16 100 U.S. 82 (1879). 
17 111 U.S. 53 (1884). 
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(and patents) from trademarks, he does use phrases such as “the creative powers of the mind,” 
“fancy or imagination,” and “genius”18 – phrases that one could easily view as representing a 
creativity-based, romantic author view of originality. In the very same sentences, however, he 
also uses phrases such as “the fruits of intellectual labor,” “work of the brain,” and “laborious 
thought,”19 seemingly without any sense that these phrases are in tension with those referring to 
“creative powers” and “genius.”  Given those juxtapositions, there is no reason to believe that 
Justice Miller would not find whatever “creative powers” are essential to copyright in the 
“intellectual labor” performed by a mapmaker when measuring and representing the height of a 
mountain or its latitude and longitude, or performed by the author of a directory when 
ascertaining the names of the people who live or work at each address in a city.  Thus, the Trade-
Mark Cases exhibit, at best, a transitional, ambiguous view of the originality requirement. 
At issue in Burrow-Giles was whether the Constitution empowered Congress to protect 
photography under copyright law.  Before photography, the pathway from states of affairs in the 
world to fixed, copyrightable representations of them always went through the human mind: the 
minds of mapmakers, directory compilers, and engravers directed the hands that fixed factual 
representations.  Photography took human minds out of that pathway: light, reflected off objects 
in the world and bent through a lens, fixed an image directly on a tangible, photosensitive 
medium.  Infringement defendants took advantage of this novelty to argue that photographs did 
not have an author, and therefore could not constitutionally be protected under the Patent and 
Copyright Clause, which granted Congress the power to protect only authors and inventors.  
When the issue reached the Supreme Court in 1884, the Court was forced to articulate exactly 
what it was that made photographs works of authorship.  Its answer – that photographs were 
copyrightable “so far as they are representatives of original intellectual conceptions of the 
author”20 – went far towards adopting a creativity-based view of originality, as it placed 
originality inside the mind of the author. 
Yet photography was not destined to remain the driving force behind adoption of a new 
conception of originality, in part because courts found the copyrightable expression in 
photographs to be more tightly bound to their representational content than expression and fact 
were bound in literary works. It was possible to rewrite a news story that had appeared in a 
competitor’s newspaper and claim that one was only taking unprotected facts; it was not possible 
to “rewrite” a photograph that a competitor had published.  And while Burrow-Giles could be 
read as suggesting that the photographer demonstrated creativity only in physically manipulating 
the scene in front of the camera, courts came to recognize that the necessary creativity could be 
found in the decision about where and when to release the shutter, a decision that accompanied 
the taking of every photograph.  As Arthur Weil phrased it in his 1916 copyright treatise, “The 
elements of thought, arrangement and selection, which appealed to the Court in the Sarony case, 
are present . . . in the taking of all photographs.  Their manifestation is a matter of degree, but 
their presence, to some extent, no matter how small, is always demonstrable.”21 If courts find 
                                                 
18 Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S., at 94. 
19 Id. 
20 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884).  For an illuminating discussion of Burrow-
Giles and the effect of photography on copyright law, see Christine Haight Farley, The Lingering Effects of 
Copyright’s Response to the Invention of Photography, 65 U. Pitt. L Rev. 385 (2004).  
21 Arthur William Weil, American Copyright Law 29-30 (1917); see Pagano v. Charles Beseler Co., 234 F. 963, 
964 (S.D.N.Y. 1916) (finding originality in a photograph of the New York Public Library because “It undoubtedly 
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creativity-based originality in all photographs, even those that photojournalistically document the 
world, and if any work that is not an exact copy of a photograph does not have the audience 
appeal and thus the commercial value of the original, then the choice between labor-based and 
creativity-based views of originality will not matter much to photography, and photography will 
not – and did not – remain a focal point of the debate between those views.   Thus, neither 
romantic author ideology, nor the Trade-Mark Cases, nor Burrow-Giles exclude the possibility 
that there was another major force at work in the transformation of the concept of originality in 
copyright law.  This article will contend that the changing structure of the news industry, 
resulting in demands for and objections to protection for news, was that major force.  
 
II.  Originality in Nineteenth-Century Copyright: Intellectual Labor and “Original 
Sources of Information Open to All” 
    
For most of the nineteenth century, American publishing, and hence copyright litigation, 
was dominated by various types of practical, nonfiction works.22   Following English precedent, 
American courts crafted a doctrine of originality that included the factual content gathered in 
these works as copyrightable subject matter.  The 1828 case that first discussed the originality 
requirement in American copyright law, Blunt v. Patten,23 presented an analysis that would be 
used in dozens of cases throughout the rest of the nineteenth century.  In Blunt, Supreme Court 
Justice Smith Thompson, writing as a circuit judge, considered mapmaker Edmund Blunt’s claim 
that Richard Patten had infringed his copyright in a nautical chart of the coast of northeastern 
North America.  Thompson writes:  
 
The natural objects from which the charts are made are open to the examination of all, 
and any one has a right to survey and make a chart. And if such surveys and charts are all 
correct, all will be alike, but no one would complain of his rights having been infringed, 
and each one may be considered an original chart. A right, in such a subject, is violated 
only when another copies from the chart of him who has secured the copyright, and 
thereby availing himself of his labor and skill.24 
 
This passage approaches originality as a matter of independent creation.  If many people 
survey the same coastal region and make charts, states Justice Thompson, each of those charts 
will be original.  Conversely, however, if one person copies a copyrighted chart made by 
another, he will infringe that copyright.  That the copyrighted chart merely accurately represents 
the position of shores and the depth of the water in a particular area is not a defense to 
infringement.  Those representations are part of the protected subject-matter of the map.  The 
representations should be protected because they were the product of the “labor and skill” of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
requires originality to determine just when to take the photograph, so as to bring out the proper setting for both 
animate and inanimate objects, with the adjunctive features of light, shade, position, etc.). 
22See Jane Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1865 (1990); Miriam Bitton, Trends in Protection for Informational Works under Copyright Law in the 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 115 (2006). 
23 3 F. Cas. 763 (No. 1580) (1828).  This is the report of Blunt’s action in equity seeking an injunction; a companion 
report of Blunt’s qui tam action seeking a monetary penalty is found at 3 F. Cas. 762 (No. 1579)(1828). 
24 Blunt, 3 F. Cas. 763, 764-65.  For an echo of this logic and rhetoric in dictum in a mid-20th-century opinion, see 
Mazer v. Stein, 340 U.S. 201, 217-18 (1954). 
 6
chart maker.  Thus, although Blunt v. Patten does not use the phrase “sweat of the brow,”25 the 
theory that factual representations should be protected as the intellectual labor of an author enters 
American copyright law in the very first case to discuss originality. 
 
Justice Thompson cites no sources, but he almost certainly drew his analysis from 
existing English treatises and cases.  Robert Henley Eden’s 1821 treatise on the Law of 
Injunctions,26 for example, notes that “maps, charts, road-books, calendars, books of chronology, 
tables of interest &c”27 are all protected by copyright, and comments that as between two such 
works on the same subject, 
 
although if the same skill, intellect, and diligence, are applied in the second instance, the 
public will receive nearly the same information from both works; yet there is no doubt 
that the latter publisher cannot on that account spare himself the labour and expense of 
actual survey, and that a court of equity will interfere to prevent a mere republication of a 
work, which the labour and skill of another person has supplied to the world.28 
 
That statement turns out to be an almost exact quote from the 1809 English case of Longman v. 
Winchester,29 in which Lord Eldon upheld an injunction against the publication of a “calendar,”30 
the contents of which were largely copied from the plaintiffs’ work.     
  
                                                 
25 The phrase “sweat of his own brow” first appeared in conjunction with copyright in Amsterdam v. Triangle 
Publications, 93 F. Supp. 79 (D. Pa. 1950).  It was used to express the somewhat unusual and now-discredited view 
that the mere combination of features from other maps cannot result in copyright in the compiled map so generated, 
as copyright in maps could only arise when the mapmaker had himself made observations of the world.  In a 
discussion of this case in 1963, Robert Gorman used the phrase “sweat of the brow.” See Robert A. Gorman, 
Copyright Protection for the Collection and Representation of Facts, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 1569, 1572 (1963).  It may 
surprise some to learn that it was not until 1984 that a court used the phrase in its now well-recognized sense as 
referring to a theory of originality that does not require creativity.  See Financial Information, Inc. v. Moody’s 
Investors Service, Inc. 751 F.2d 501, 506 (2d Cir. 1984).   
26 Robert Henley Eden, A Treatise on the Law of Injunctions (1821). 
27 Id. at 282. 
28 Id. at 282-83.  Another revealing discussion is found in George Jeremy’s 1828 treatise on equity jurisdiction: 
[A]lthough there are some mental productions of such a character, that the author of them must 
undoubtedly be the original composer, there are others which may de derived from resemblance to some 
objects of nature or of art, with respect to which it may be extremely difficult to ascertain whether a 
subsequent publication of the same description of work is a piracy or not.  This observation applies to the 
cases of maps, and of other plates, translations, calendars, and all productions of a similar nature. 
George Jeremy, A Treatise on the Equity Jurisdiction of the High Court of Chancery 322 (1828).  Note that the 
works protected by copyright are conceived of as exhibiting an essential unity – they are all “mental productions”; 
that there are certain types of works which might raise more difficult evidentiary issues with respect to their 
originality; and that these types of works do not neatly fit the fact/fiction divide – a translation of a work of fiction 
might pose the same evidentiary issue of originality as a map. 
29 16 Ves. Jun. 269, 33 Eng. Rep. 987 (1809).  The parallel language in Longman is: “if the same skill, intelligence 
and diligence, are applied in the second instance, the public would receive nearly the same information from both 
works: but there is no doubt, that this Court would interpose to prevent a mere republication of a work, which the 
labour and skill of another person had supplied to the world.”  12 Ves. Jun., at 270; 33 Eng. Rep.. at 987. 
30 In the common usage of the time, a “calendar” was actually a kind of almanac, at the core of which was a 
directory of important officials, in this case the members of the Houses of Parliament.  A good example of such a 
calendar is “The Court and City Kalendar, or Gentlemen’s Register for the Year 1767”; a digitized version of 
Charles Adams’s copy of this publication can be found at http://www.archive.org/details/courtcitykalenda00john. 
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 Dozens of similar examples from English and American cases and treatises could be 
cited.  The most important example in an American treatise is probably a passage in Joseph 
Story’s influential and widely distributed Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence,31 first 
published in 1836: “The difficulty [in cases of maps, charts, translations, and road books] is to 
distinguish, what belongs to the exclusive labors of a single mind, from what is the common 
source of the materials of the knowledge used by all. . . . [A second man] may work on the same 
original materials; but he cannot exclusively and evasively use those already collected and 
embodied by another.”32  Another important appearance is in George Ticknor Curtis’s 1847 
Treatise on the Law of Copyright, the first American treatise devoted solely to copyright.  Curtis 
echoes Story, and earlier English cases: “[I]f a person collects an account of natural curiosities . . 
. or of mere matters of statistical or geographical information, and employs the labor of his mind 
in giving a description of them, his own description may be the subject of copyright.”33  He 
makes it equally clear that copyright in such a work protects, not just stylistic flourishes, but the 
factual representation itself: “It is equally competent to any other person to compile and publish 
a similar work.  But it must be substantially new and original, like the first work, by resort to the 
original sources, and must not copy or adopt from the other, upon the notion that the subject is 
common.”34   
 
Courts and commentators continued to use this analysis and logic right into the 1880s.  
American cases like Lawrence v. Dana (1869),35 Farmer v. Calvert Lithographic, Engraving & 
Map Publishing Co. (1872),36 Banks v. McDivitt (1875),37 and List Publishing Co. v. Keller 
(1887),38 and English cases like Kelly v. Morris (1866),39 Morris v. Ashbee (1868),40 and Hogg v. 
                                                 
31 Joseph Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence as Administered in England and America (1836). 
32 Id. at 216.  Three years later, in Gray v. Russell, 10 F. Cas. 1035 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 5728), Justice Story 
had the opportunity to present the same analysis in a judicial opinion: (“There is no foundation in law for the 
argument, that because the same sources of information are open to all persons, and by the exercise of their own 
industry and talents and skill, they could, from all of these sources, have produced a similar work, one party may at 
second hand, without any exercise of industry, talents, or skill, borrow from another all the materials, which have 
been accumulated and combined together by him.  Take the case of a map of a county, or of a state, or an empire . . 
.”). 
33 George Ticknor Curtis, A Treatise on the Law of Copyright 174 (1847).   Curtis is borrowing language from Lord 
Eldon in the 1803 case of Hogg v. Kirby: “  8 Ves. Jun 215, 32 Eng. Rep. 336 (1803): “I do not see, why, if a person 
collects an account of natural curiosities, and such articles, and employs the labour of his mind by giving a 
description of them, that is not as much a literary work as many others.” Id. at 221-222. 
34 Id. 
35 15 F.Cas. 26 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8136) (“[W]here there are certain common objects of information which 
must, if described correctly, be described in the same words, a subsequent compiler is bound to do for himself that 
which was done by the first compiler.”). 
36 8 F. Cas. 1022 (E.D. Mich. 1872) (No. 4651) (“The defendant, no doubt, had the right to go to the common source 
of information, and having ascertained those boundaries, to have drawn them upon his map, notwithstanding that in 
this respect it would have been precisely like plaintiff’s map (which of course it would have been if they were both 
correct).  But he had no right to avail himself of this very labor on the part of complainant in order to avoid it 
himself.”). 
37 2 F. Cas. 759 (1875) (No. 961).   
38 30 F. 772 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1887) ("No compiler of a book such as directories, guide-books, road-books, statistical 
tables, can acquire, by copyright, a monopoly of the matter published, but the subsequent compiler must investigate 
for himself from the original sources of information which are open to all."). 
39 L.R. 1 Eq. 697 (1866). 
40 L.R. 7 Eq. 34 (1868). 
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Scott (1874)41 all followed the pattern, as did American treatises like James Appleton Morgan’s 
The Law of Literature (1875)42 and Eaton Drone’s Treatise on the Law of Property in Intellectual 
Productions (1879),43 and English treatises like Walter Arthur Copinger’s Law of Copyright (2d 
ed. 1881).44    The Supreme Court did not have occasion to decide whether copyright protection 
extended to representations of facts; before 1879, it had only decided seven cases that touched on 
copyright issues.45  As already mentioned above, however, Supreme Court Justices Joseph Story 
and Smith Thompson did have occasion to do so while riding circuit, and both held that copying 
of factual content could amount to copyright infringement.  
 
Factual accounts may have been embraced as copyrightable subject matter, but that did 
not mean that copying a small portion, or even a substantial portion, of someone’s factual 
account would necessarily amount to infringement.   Two doctrines concerning the scope of 
copyright protection are important to understanding why such copying might not constitute 
infringement.  The first is the “new toil” or improvement doctrine, under which a charge of 
infringement might be avoided by demonstrating that the defendant added substantially new 
material or otherwise improved an older work, even if he admittedly copied from the old.  For 
example, in the 1847 case of Webb v. Powers,46 the court stated that a new compilation may 
infringe an older one if it uses too much of the latter, “and is not characterized by enough new or 
improved, to indicate new toil or talent.”47  This doctrine came under attack by the mid-
nineteenth century, and has been contemptuously rejected by jurists of the stature of Learned 
Hand,48 but in a weakened form it still survives as the transformative use factor of fair use 
analysis.49 
     
Second, courts and commentators began to use a “market substitute” approach to 
copyright infringement, in part as a replacement for the “new toil” doctrine, although the two 
approaches could in some cases lead to similar results.50   L. Ray Patterson and Craig Joyce have 
                                                 
41 L.R. 18 Eq. 444 (1874). 
42 James Appleton Morgan, The Law of Literature 328-331 (1875). 
43 Eaton s. Drone, A Treatise on the Law of Property in Intellectual Productions 201-202 (1879) (“Collections of 
Well-Known Facts”). 
44 Walter Arthur Copinger, The Law of Copyright in Works of Literature and Art (2d ed. 1881). 
45 See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (1834); Backus v. Gould, 48 U.S. 798 (1849); Stephens v. Cady, 55 U.S. 528 
(1852); Stevens v. Gladding, 58 U.S. 447 (1854); Little v. Hall, 59 U.S. 165 (1855); Paige v. Banks, 80 U.S. 608 
(1871); Parris v. Hexamer,  99 U.S. 674 (1878). 
46  29 F. Cas. 511 (C.C. 1st Cir. 1847) (No. 17,323). 
47 Id.  This doctrine is often said to have been wholly repudiated.  Most copyright lawyers have probably had 
occasion to read Learned Hand’s witty statement that Yet the principle behind the doctrine survives in fair use 
analysis to the extent that courts weigh whether or not a claimed fair use is “transformative.”  Obviously, the 
“market substitute” and “transformation” issues are not always independent.   
48See  Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corporation, 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936) (“no plagiarist can excuse the 
wrong by showing how much of his work he did not pirate”).   
49 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (“the goal of copyright, to promote science and the 
arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works . . . and the more transformative the new work, 
the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use”); 
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 
244 (2d Cir. 2006). 
50 A transformation in the nature of a parody, for example, is unlikely to be a market substitute precisely because of 
the transformation.  Other transformations, however – for example,. a “new and improved” version of a book with a 
few corrections and some added material – could well be market substitutes. 
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dubbed the approach a “monopoly of the market” approach.51  Importantly, that approach 
focused heavily on actual markets, not on “potential markets” as the fourth factor in the section 
107 fair use inquiry now does.52  What copyright protected was the copying of enough of the 
plaintiff’s work that the defendant’s work would function as a market substitute for the plaintiff’s 
work.  Thus, for example, some abridgments of other works would not infringe, because they 
would be “much less complete and useful” than the original, would be “suited for a different and 
humbler class of readers . . . rather than a substitute with the same class.”53 
 
The crucial point here is that neither the “new toil” doctrine nor the “market substitute” 
doctrine was thought to be limited to factual works.  Rather, these doctrines formed part of 
infringement analysis for the full range of copyrightable subject matter.  Thus, for example, a 
translation of a novel, a work of pure fiction, might equally be found not to amount to 
infringement, on the ground that it was the product of significant new toil, or was not a market 
substitute for the novel in its original language.54  The result was that these doctrines provided a 
kind of “safety valve,” allowing the copying of significant factual matter that, if prohibited, 
might call the institution of copyright into question, without singling out factual accounts as 
needing a special exemption from copyright protection.          
  
One last case deserves extended discussion. In 1829, a year after Blunt v. Patten, Justice 
Thompson, again riding circuit, decided in a case called Clayton v. Stone55 that a “price-current” 
– a daily newspaper that reported commodity prices – was not a “book” within the meaning of 
the Copyright Act, which at the time extended copyright protection only to “maps, charts and 
books.”  First, reasoned Justice Thompson, the Copyright Act should be read in light of the 
purpose of copyright as stated in the constitution, namely, to promote the progress of Science.  
To contribute to science, works had to be of a “permanent and durable character”; 56 the 
                                                 
51 L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Monopolizing the Law: The Scope of Copyright Protection for Law Reports and 
Statutory Compilations, 36 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 719, 798 (1989); see Ginsburg, supra note 22, at 1877; Oren Bracha, 
Owning Ideas 325-329 (2005) (http://www.obracha.net/oi/oi.htm). 
52 See 17 U.S.C. §107(4) (incorporating “the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work” in fair use analysis).  
53 Webb v. Powers, 29 F. Cas. 511 (C.C.D. Mass. 1847) (No. 17,323); see Gray v. Russell, 10 F. Cas. 1035 (C.C.D. 
Mass. 1839) (per Story, J.) (noting that whether an abridgement infringes the original is a matter of “whether it will, 
in its present form, prejudice or supersede the original work” and “whether it will be adapted to the same class of 
readers”).    Some early 20th century cases taking the same approach include Social Register Ass’n v. Murphy, 128 
F. 116 (C.C.D.R.I. 1904) (noting that a “society” directory might not “constitute [an] invasion” of a general city 
directory’s “general field or purpose”); Sampson & Murdock Co. v. Seaver-Radford Co., 140 F. 539 (1st Cir. 1905) 
(“instances may be easily cited where portions of a copyright book may be published for purposes other than those 
for which the original book was intended”).  There was certainly not a uniformity of opinion on the validity of the 
right of abridgement; Justice McLean, for example, criticizes it in Story v. Holcombe, 23 F. Cas. 171 (1847) (No. 
13,497), as resting on reasoning that is “false in fact” because there are “many who are able to buy the original 
work, that would be satisfied with the abridgement”).     
54 Cf. Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201, 207 (1853) (No. 13, 514) (holding that a German translation of Harriet 
Beecher Stowe’s novel “Uncle Tom’s Cabin” did not infringe her copyright in the novel) (“[I]n questions of 
copyright, the inquiry is not, whether the defendant has used the thoughts, conceptions, information or discoveries 
promulgated by the original, but whether his composition may be considered a new work, requiring invention, 
learning, and judgment, or only a mere transcript of the whole or parts of the original, with merely colorable 
variations.”) 
55 5 F. Cas. 999 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1829) (No. 2872). 
56 Id.   
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plaintiff’s newspaper was of too “fluctuating and fugitive a form.”57  Second, the copyright act 
prescribed formalities that seemed so lengthy and cumbersome – most pointedly, a requirement 
that a copy of the work’s registration be published for four weeks in at least one newspaper – that 
it seemed unlikely that Congress intended them to apply to “a work of so ephemeral a character 
as that of a newspaper.”58  
 
It is tempting to read current categories back on to the Clayton case and conclude that the 
newspaper was denied copyright because its contents – commodity price quotations – were 
purely factual and thus unoriginal.  But the analysis in the case does not proceed along those 
lines, and, indeed, one would not expect Justice Thompson, the author of Blunt v. Patten, to use 
such an analysis.  Rather, the relevant distinctions were between lasting contributions and 
ephemeral ones, and between learning and mere industry.  An 1848 case which uses the same 
analysis makes it clear that the Clayton distinctions did not exclude factual matter from copyright 
protection.  In Scoville v. Toland,59 Justice John McLean held that labels, which served the 
purely commercial purpose of identifying goods for sale, were not copyrightable.  At the same 
time, he commented that “lunar tables” – tables showing the dates on which the moon is in its 
various phases – were copyrightable books even if only printed on a single sheet.  That the lunar 
tables were purely factual was not a matter of which Justice McLean took any note.  Rather, he 
was satisfied that they made a lasting contribution to learning or science, instead of being 
ephemeral or commercial in character. 
 
The holding of Clayton v. Stone is of uncertain scope – was it supposed to disqualify 
from copyright only commodity price reports, or did it extend more broadly to cover the contents 
of all daily newspapers?60 There was never any chance to find out, because, in spite of the 
                                                 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 21 F. Cas. 893 (1848) (No. 12,553). 
60 There was a distinctly separate business press in the United States in the early 1800s, and Justice Thompson may 
have taken for granted that he was focusing on business papers, and that that would continue to be a stable, distinct 
category.  Interestingly, time has proven that Justice Thompson was right about the ephemeral nature of such papers.  
As historian John McCusker has noted, “[i]t seems the peculiar fate of business newspapers that, despite being 
published in reasonable press runs, they appear to have been less likely to have been preserved than the more 
general purpose papers.”  John J. McCusker, The Demise of Distance: The Business Press and the Origins of the 
Information Revolution in the Early Modern Atlantic World, 110 The American Historical Review 295,  n. 60 
(2005). 
The holding in Clayton, whatever it was, was gradually eroded over the next half-century.  The requirement 
of publication of four weeks’ notice of the registration, emphasized by Justice Thompson, was abolished in 1831.  
The Clayton decision was heavily criticized by George Ticknor Curtis in his 1847 copyright treatise.  See George 
Ticknor Curtis, A Treatise on the Law of Copyright 108 (1847).  By the time Eaton Drone published his treatise in 
1879, he could comment (without citing American cases, for there were none) that “[a] more liberal doctrine . . . 
now prevails.  The statutory requirement [of publishing a copy of the registration for four weeks] has been long 
obsolete.  Within the half century that has elapsed since that judgment was rendered, the character of American 
newspapers has been wholly changed.  Much that now appears in them has a permanent literary or scientific value, 
and as such should be entitled to protection.”  Eaton S. Drone, A Treatise on the Law of Intellectual Productions in 
Great Britain and the United States 229 n.1 (1879).  In 1869, an English court had decided that the contents of a 
newspaper were copyrightable, over argument from the defendant’s counsel that newspapers were too ephemeral for 
copyright (no doubt an argument suggested to counsel by Clayton v. Stone).  See Cox v. Land and Water Journal 
Company, [LR] 9 Eq. 324 (1869).  A year later, Walter Copinger cited Cox in the first edition of his treatise on 
copyright for the proposition that newspapers were copyrightable.  See Walter Arthur Copinger, Esq., The Law of 
Copyright in Works of Literature and Art 224 (1870).  By 1886, the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New 
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dominance of nonfiction works in American copyright litigation over the next fifty years, no 
reported case concerned a newspaper.  Why was that?  One answer is that newspapers might 
have been deterred from seeking copyright by the burdensome requirements of registration.  That 
answer is not satisfactory, however, because if copyright protection were important to 
newspapers, they would have sought reform of the registration requirement, and they did not do 
so until the 1880s.  Thus the question remains, and because the answer to this question is crucial 
to understanding originality doctrine for most of the nineteenth century, this article turns to the 
task of providing one. 
 
III. The Nineteenth Century News Industry: Tradition and Change 
 
A.  Pre-Telegraph News Gathering and Dissemination: The Dominance of the 
Exchange System and the Partisan Press.  Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, 
newspapers gathered out-of-town news primarily by means of exchanging copies of their papers 
with newspapers from other cities.   Well-established newspapers in large cities would have 
exchange relationships with dozens and even hundreds of other newspapers.  Thus, for example, 
the Washington, D.C.-based Daily National Intelligencer boasted in 1820: “We receive at our 
office about three hundred papers, printed in all parts of the United States, from Mobile and New 
Orleans south, to Detroit north; and from Eastport in the east, to Arkansaw in the west. . . From 
Upper and Lower Canada, we receive several newspapers . . .”61 
 
This exchange system was promoted and heavily subsidized by the colonial post office, 
and after independence by the federal post office, which until 1873 carried newspaper exchanges 
without charge.  The practice started by custom in the early 1700s, and was officially sanctioned 
in a 1758 policy statement by Benjamin Franklin and William Hunter, joint deputy postmasters 
general for the American colonies.62  In 1792, Congress enacted the exchange privilege into 
federal law, declaring “That every printer of newspapers may send one paper to each and every 
other printer of newspapers within the United States, free of postage . . .”63   
 
The scale of the resulting exchange system was vast.  In 1843, just before the advent of 
the telegraph, an estimated seven million exchanges were carried by the post office free of 
charge.64  As Richard Kielbowicz has calculated, that meant that, on average, each of the 1600 
                                                                                                                                                             
York seemed to assume as a matter of course that an issue of Harper’s Weekly, properly registered before 
publication, was under copyright as a book. See Harper v. Shoppell, 26 F. 519 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886).  The particular 
portion of the periodical at issue was an engraving.  Oddly enough, Harper cites Clayton v. Stone as supporting the 
proposition that a “book” in the copyright sense can be a single sheet of paper (and by extension, can be a 
newspaper).  See id. at 519. 
61 Daily National Intelligencer, Wednesday, August 2, 1820, p.3. 
62 Richard B. Kielbowicz, News Gathering by Mail in the Age of the Telegraph: Adapting to a New Technology, 28 
Technology and Culture 26, 29  (1987). 
63 Post Office Act of 1792, 1 U.S. Statutes at Large 238.  
64 Richard B. Kielbowicz, supra note 62, at 30 n. 16.  In total, about 39 million newspapers were carried by the U.S. 
postal system in 1840.  See Richard R. John, Recasting the Information Infrastructure for the Industrial Age, in 
Alfred Dupont Chandler, Nation Transformed by Information: How Information Has Shaped the United States from 
Colonial Times to the Present 55, 61 (2000).  The 32 million that were not exchanges were not carried free of 
charge, but they were carried at very low rates, as compared to those charged for letters: “newspapers made up as 
much as 95 percent of the weight of the mail, while accounting for no more than about 15 percent of the revenue.”  
Id.        
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newspapers in the country was receiving about 4400 exchanges per year, or about a dozen every 
day.65  The weight of these exchanges probably amounted to 15% or more of the total weight of 
mail carried by the United States postal system, yet the service was provided completely free of 
charge, to promote the government policy of spreading news throughout the nation.  
 
Why was news gathered and spread through this informal system of exchanges, rather 
than through propertization and sale of news items?  If the legal structure for propertization was 
not in place, why didn’t newspapers more actively lobby for it?  Likely economic explanations 
include the difficulty of enforcing any such rights, the purely local nature of newspaper 
publishing (which avoided direct competition with all out-of-town papers), and the lead-time 
advantage within local markets due to existing typesetting and printing technology.  In addition, 
many newspapers looked as much to partisan subsidies and patronage as to markets for support.  
 
As for the difficulty of enforcement, intercity transportation and hence communication in 
the pre-telegraph era was slow.  Historical geographer Allan Pred has measured the mean lag-
time of information between American cities from the 1790s to the 1840s.  In 1794, it took about 
seven days on average for news to travel between New York and Washington, DC, and 45 days 
for news to travel from New York to Cincinnati.66  Twenty-one years later, in 1817, the time-lag 
from New York to Washington three days; New York to Cincinnati was 19 days; and New York 
to Chicago was 43 days.67  By 1841, with the coming of the railroad, news could travel from 
New York to Washington in as little as ten hours,68 but the average time lag was still longer; the 
lag between New York and Cincinnati was about eight days, and from New York to Chicago 
about 10 days. 
 
The slow speed of communication also made it difficult to manage businesses that had 
locations in many different cities.  Almost all newspapers, just as most other businesses at the 
time, served purely local markets, and therefore did not care if newspapers in other cities copied 
their stories.   
 
The pre-electronic delivery of news through the transportation system, by means of the 
physical delivery of newspapers, could also lead to evidentiary difficulties in demonstrating that 
one newspaper copied another.  The same carriage, ship, or railroad that brought one newspaper 
brought others, and also usually brought people who themselves knew the news from the 
departure city.  Under the exchange system, it was the custom for newspapers to credit the source 
of news items, both as a courtesy and to enhance credibility; but if newspapers had wanted to 
conceal the source of their news, it is likely that they often could have. 
 
Many larger cities had more than one newspaper, and there certainly was competition 
between them.  But newspapers could often effectively compete against other local papers 
                                                 
65 Id.   
66 See Allan R. Pred, Urban Systems Development and the Long-Distance Flow of Information Through 
Preelectronic U.S. Newspapers, 47 Economic Geography 498, 511 (1971).  Other important time-lag studies include 
Donald Lewis Shaw, At the Crossroads: Change and Continuity in American Press News, 1820-1860, Journalism 
History, VIII (Summer 1981), 38; Susan R. Brooker-Gross, “Timeliness: Interpretations from a Sample of 19th 
Century Newspapers,” Journalism Quarterly 58 (Winter 1981), 594-98. 
67 Id. at 513-515. 
68 Id. at 517. 
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without propertizing news, given the time and cost of copying.   Until the 1884 invention of the 
linotype machine by Ottmar Mergenthaler, type was set by hand, as it had been for several 
centuries, and it took hours to set type for a newspaper edition.  Printing technology improved 
dramatically during the nineteenth century – the steam-powered press and the rotary press, 
invented in 1812 and 1847, respectively, changed top printing speeds from about 300 pages per 
hour to 20,000 -- but it still took several hours to print and assemble an edition of a newspaper in 
any volume.  In addition, most newspapers worked on a daily schedule; it cost them more to 
print an “extra” that was released outside the normal schedule.  As a result, a newspaper that 
obtained a “scoop” on a news story usually got a lead-time advantage of at least several hours, 
and often an entire day.  That was likely enough to sell a large number of newspapers, and over 
time to gain a reputation as a better newspaper.  In 1851, Horace Greeley, editor of the New 
York Tribune, went to London to testify before a parliamentary committee, and gave an account 
of the lead-time advantage he thought his paper enjoyed:  
 
The fact that certain journals have the earliest news soon becomes notorious, and almost 
every one wants his newspaper with his breakfast, delivered between the hours of five 
and half past seven.  They take the morning papers to read with their breakfast; and those 
who take the news after we issue it can not have it in time to deliver it to a very large 
number in a suitable morning season, and we regard it as of no consequence.69 
 
Another important factor in the first half of the nineteenth century was the dominance of 
the partisan press.  Most newspapers were identified with a political party, and were heavily 
subsidized to serve as the party organ.  At every level and from every branch of government, 
newspaper owners received lucrative printing contracts from the party in power.  For example, 
from 1819 to 1846, each house of Congress elected a printer to publish its proceedings; the 
contracts, which went to the publishers of such newspapers as the National Intelligencer, the 
Globe, and the Madisonian, carried profit margins of 20 to 55 percent.70  Moreover, members of 
Congress had franking privileges – the ability to use the postal system free of charge – and 
frequently used it to send favored newspapers for free across the country.71  Over in the 
executive branch, President Andrew Jackson awarded printing contracts to Jacksonian 
                                                 
69Frederic Hudson, Journalism in the United States from 1690 to 1872, p. 542 (1873) (Hudson reprints 
generous excerpts of the transcript of Greeley’s testimony).    Greeley also acknowledges that, in the case of 
important news, the Tribune would take precautions to ensure that no copy of the story left the hands of its 
confidential agents until the moment that the printed copies of the newspapers were distributed at 5:00 a.m.  See id.   
Greeley’s comments are echoed in a later New York Times article: 
Priority of publication is so enormous an advantage in the business of printing news, that when 
this advantage is secured the newspaper that has secured it can afford to look with complacent indifference 
upon copyists.  There is nothing, for example, to prevent a man from establishing a paper to be published 
here in New-York at noon, or even in the early forenoon, which shall contain all the news of all of the 
morning papers and shall be sold for a tenth part of what all the morning papers cost.  Nobody has ever 
done this, because nobody has ever thought that such an enterprise would pay.  News once printed is 
abandoned by the original publisher, who has already made his profit from it, to whoever may choose to 
reproduce it. 
“Copyright in News,” New York Times, February 2, 1884, p. 4;  see The Milwaukee Sentinel (Milwaukee, 
WI), February 22, 1884, p. 3 (“There is such an advantage in priority of publication that no enterprising journal will 
ask for special protection.”). 
70 See Gerald J. Baldasty, The Commercialization of News in the Nineteenth Century 20 & 20 n. 68 (1992). 
71 Id. at 20 
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newspapers, not only in Washington, D.C., but in Louisville, Boston, Philadelphia, Concord and 
Columbia.72  He also appointed editors of favored newspapers to patronage positions, of which 
the most popular was postmaster; between 50 and 60 newspaper editors around the country 
received patronage jobs.73  Support of partisan newspapers was just as common at the state and 
local level.74  Newspapers of the era thus tended to be focused on politics and political news,75 
and sought their rewards more from governments and political parties than from subscribers, 
single-copy purchasers, or advertisers.  In this respect, newspaper editors were like composers of 
just a few generations before – they looked to patrons rather than markets as their primary source 
of support.76     
 
The end result of these technological and social conditions was that newspapers had little 
or no need for copyright, and embraced a culture of copying.  It would thus be a mistake to 
conclude that the placement of the newspapers outside of the copyright system was the result of a 
single judicial decision like Clayton v. Stone, or of a single statutory requirement like that of 
registration.  Undoubtedly, registering each daily issue of a paper could amount to a significant 
expense, and several authors mention the inconvenience of registration as a reason why 
newspapers were not copyrighted.  For example, in his 1875 treatise, James Appleton Morgan 
wrote that “[t]he impractability of copyrighting under the statutes each succeeding issue of a 
newspaper, renders them somewhat independent of the laws of copyright, though there is no 
reason why each successive issue should not be duly entered according to act of congress, if the 
proprietor should desire to do so.”77  Four years later, in 1879, Eaton Drone chimed in: “In the 
case of a daily newspaper, [registering each issue] will be found inconvenient and perhaps 
impracticable.  In practice, it is not done.”78  Yet in weighing the impracticability of registration, 
                                                 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 21-22. 
75 Gerald Baldasty shows the enormous shift in the content of newspapers from the 1830s to the 1890s.  In 1831-32, 
his survey of five metropolitan newspapers reveals that 50.5% of their column space was devoted to politics, and 
only 11.6 % to crime and courts, accidents, society and women, and leisure activities; by 1897, his survey of eight 
metropolitan newspapers found that only 19.3% was devoted to politics, and 39.1 % to the latter categories.  See id. 
at 123.  
76 On the transition of composers from support by churches and courts to orientation towards markets, see F.M. 
Scherer, Quarter Notes and Bank Notes: The Economics of Music Composition in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth 
Centuires  (2004). 
77 James Appleton Morgan, The Law of Literature, vol. II, p. 381 (1875). 
78 Eaton S. Drone, A Treatise on the Law of Property in Intellectual Productions 170 (1879).  
 Unlike daily newspapers, major weekly and monthly periodicals, which often featured essays, serial 
novels, engravings, and commentary rather than news, were often registered.  See The New York Times, Nov. 20, 
1870, p. 1 (introducing the new Copyright Act of 1870, which for the first time established a single office for 
registering copyrights in the Library of Congress) (“Nearly or quite all the magazines were copyrighted under the 
old law, but the copyrighting of newspapers was not practiced.  Nor is it now, very generally; still, several weekly 
newspapers and literary papers are entered regularly—among others, the pictorial papers of Frank Leslie, and the 
Harper’s, the Hearth & Home, the Ledger, the Christian Union; and the time may not be so very distant when all 
our important weekly and daily papers will secure in the same way their rights to what they print.”). The first issue 
of Harper’s Weekly was published on January 3, 1857; beginning with the issue of April 9, 1859, each issue 
displays the statutorily required notice of registration.  (The issues of Harper’s Weekly published between 1857 and 
1912 are available on the HarpWeek website, http://app.harpweek.com/.) Similarly, Frank Leslie’s Illustrated 
Newspaper was first published on December 15, 1855; beginning on April 14, 1857, every issue displays a notice of 
registration. (The issues of Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper published between 1855 and 1892 are available in 
the Gale “Nineteenth Century U.S. Newspapers” database.)   
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one has to consider the potential benefits of registration, as well as the burden.  The fact was that 
the potential benefits were slight, so that taking on even a modest burden did not seem 
worthwhile. 
 
The fact that newspapers, for economic reasons, remained outside of the copyright 
system, had a significant if completely unnoticed impact on the prevailing intellectual-labor view 
of the originality requirement for copyright.  That view purported to be quite broad in scope: any 
factual representation was the result of mental labor and was therefore copyrightable, and no one 
could copy wholesale that representation as a substitute for going out into the world and doing 
the hard work of gathering the factual details himself.  By its own terms, that logic should apply 
to narrative accounts of current events, as well as non-narrative representations of states of 
affairs like maps and city directories.  In practice, however, so long as newspapers remained 
outside of copyright, originality doctrine did not have to come to grips with copyright issues 
concerning such news accounts. 
 
Moreover, the effect of newspapers remaining outside of copyright spread beyond the 
papers themselves to any historical or biographical account that was not based on first-hand 
observation, since the great bulk of second-hand accounts could be traced through uncopyrighted 
newspapers.  Thus, for example, in the 1841 case of Folsom v. Marsh79 the plaintiffs claimed that 
the defendants had copied many of George Washington’s letters, but they made no claim as to 
the historical narrative that accompanied the letters and put them into context.  Justice Story 
wrote: “So far as the narrative goes, it is either original, or derived (at least as far as the matter 
has been brought before the court) from common sources of information, open to all authors.”80  
The phrase “common sources of information, open to all authors” was usually used to refer to the 
world itself, but events that had taken place long ago were as a practical matter no longer “open 
to all authors.” What were still available to authors were newspaper accounts, or histories 
derived from newspaper accounts.  Because they were not under copyright, they were also 
“common sources of information, open to all authors.”    
 
B. Mid-Century Changes in News Gathering and Dissemination: The Telegraph and 
the Demise of the Party Press.  The invention and deployment of the electric telegraph 
dramatically changed many industries, and the news industry was prominent among them.  
Telegraph lines began commercial operation in the mid-1840s.  Within two decades, they 
blanketed the country.  By 1866, Western Union controlled 37,380 miles of telegraph lines and 
2,250 telegraph offices in almost every town and city of any size in the United States.81  1866 
                                                                                                                                                             
There are a few scattered mentions of registrations of daily newspapers.  See Frederic Hudson, Journalism 
in the United States from 1690 to 1870, p. 723 (1873) (“Several papers, mostly weekly publications, although we 
have seen one daily newspaper, regularly appear with [registration notices]”); Richard Rogers Bowker, Copyright: 
Its History and Its Law 88 (1912) (mentioning that a daily price list of the New York Cotton Exchange was 
registered every day); Tribune Co. of Chicago v. Associated Press, 116 F. 126, 127 (C.C. Ill. 1900) (the Chicago 
Daily News had begun to register each daily edition of the newspaper, perhaps in anticipation of litigation); Egbert 
v. Greenberg, 100 F. 447 (N.D. Cal. 1900) (the proprietors of the “Daily Racing News,” plaintiffs in the case, had 
evidently begun to register that paper). 
799 F. Cas. 342 (C.C. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). 
80 Id. at 347. 
81 See Robert Luther Thompson, Wiring a Continent: The History of the Telegraph Industry in the United States 
1832 – 1866, 426 (1947).  There were 75,686 miles of wire strung along those lines.  Id. 
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also marked the completion of the first successful transatlantic cable,82 thus enabling telegraphic 
communication between the Old World and the New.83  A transcontinental telegraph line from 
Chicago to San Francisco had been completed in 1861, eight years before the transcontinental 
railroad.  Through a combination of effects, this revolutionary telecommunications technology 
enabled and spurred on calls for increased legal protection for news. 
 
First, the speed of communication over long distances made possible the development of 
geographically dispersed, and hence larger, business organizations.   Management in one city 
could receive reports from and send orders to employees in other cities within minutes, if 
necessary, and daily interaction could become routine.84  Two prime examples of the 
development of larger organizations were those intimately associated with news gathering and 
dissemination: Western Union and the Associated Press.  By 1866, Western Union became the 
first industrial monopoly, controlling over 90% of the telegraph business in the United States.85  
The Associated Press, founded in 1848 just after the commercialization of the telegraph, 
underwent several reorganizations in the second half of the nineteenth century, but in one form 
or another dominated news gathering and dissemination in the United States after the Civil War.  
Although most individual newspapers remained locally owned, they were members of 
associations that competed on a national scale.  Exchanges of news between members were now 
centrally controlled, and exchanges of news with non-members were prohibited, on pain of 
revocation of membership.86 
 
 Telegraphic communication also made it easier to pursue enforcement actions in places 
remote from a business’s head office – communications between attorney and client allowed for 
effective pursuit and control of litigation.  By the 1890s, the Associated Press was involved in 
lawsuits against newspapers in New York, Washington, D.C., Minneapolis, Milwaukee, 
Chicago, and St. Louis, a geographic reach of litigation that would have been unthinkable 
without communication by telegraph.87  Moreover, telegraphic communication would often make 
it easier to prove that the plaintiff’s news dispatch was the source of the defendant’s story.  The 
telegraph message carrying the news arrived long before any people who might be carrying it as 
word-of-mouth, and as long as Western Union and Associated Press were dominant, there were 
unlikely to be other telegraph lines or news services through which the defendant could have 
gotten the story.   
 
 Second, the telegraph could effectively destroy the lead-time advantage that had 
previously protected news organizations.  Several competitive scenarios irked newspapers that 
                                                 
82 See  Annteresa Lubrano, The Telegraph: How Technology Innovation Caused Social Change 9, 155 (1997). 
83 The telegraph was not the first telecommunications technology.  Newspapers, governments, and others had been 
experimenting with carrier pigeons, semaphore systems, and the like.  But the telegraph far outstripped these in 
speed and distance. 
84 Richard Du Boff argues that telegraph use had scale effects, control effects, and intelligence effects that led to 
dominance of single firms in many markets.  See Richard B. DuBoff, The Telegraph in Nineteenth-Century 
America: Technology and Monopoly, in 26 Comparative Studies in Society and History 571, 573-579 (1984).    
85 See id. at 572.  
86 See Victor Rosewater, History of Cooperative News-Gathering in the United States 260-261 (1930). 
87 See The Law of the Associated Press, Vol. I (1914) (republishing documents from Associated Press litigation 
against the publishers of the Chicago Inter Ocean, p. 3; the St. Louis Star, p. 89; the New York Sun, p. 286; the 
Washington News, p. 446; the Minneapolis Tribune, p. 472; and the Milwaukee Daily News and Milwaukee 
Germania, p. 506). 
 17
had spent money to gather news.  Large-city newspapers had begun to gain audiences in the 
surrounding countryside as improved railroad lines made far-flung distribution possible in less 
than a day.  Small-town papers along those railroad lines, however, would arrange for agents to 
telegraph the news as soon as the big-city papers were available in the big cities, and the small-
town papers could then go to press before the train from the big city arrived.  Thus, Frederic 
Hudson reported in 1873, a “journalist that was desirous of an influence beyond the limits of the 
city where his newspaper is published” did not always view the telegraph kindly, “especially 
when he reads an announcement that ‘the Elmira (N.Y.) Advertiser publishes telegraph news 
fifteen hours in advance of the receipt of the New York dailies.’”88     
 
 Lead-time advantage was also destroyed when telegraphic transmissions cut across time 
zones. The Associated Press and some of the New York newspapers complained about this 
scenario in the early 1880s: “The complaint is made that the New York correspondents for 
newspapers in Chicago and other points west to San Francisco, by reason of the difference of 
time in their favor, can, without credit, telegraph all there is worth telegraphing from New York 
to their respective journals.  They not only can, but do.  One or two San Francisco newspapers, 
because of this, have given notice of a desire to withdraw from the Associated Press.”89  The 
facts of International News Service v. Associated Press,90 the famous case that ended up in the 
Supreme Court in 1918 (and to which this Article will return), involve such a scenario.  The 
International News Service was allegedly copying Associated Press news stories as they were 
published in New York newspapers, and telegraphing them to the west coast, three time zones 
earlier.  West coast newspapers that were INS subscribers could then print the news in time for 
their morning or evening editions, and compete head-on against their AP-subscriber 
competitors.91 
 
A third scenario involving the loss of lead time arose with the development of “tickers,” 
machines that could print text from a telegraphic signal without the need of a human operator.  
                                                 
88 Frederic Hudson, Journalism in the United States from 1690 to 1872, p. 595 (1873).  Another new source of 
competition for big-city newspapers were the producers of “patent insides” for smaller-town papers – pre-set 
printing plates that would be shipped out to smaller towns for printing together with local content on the covers.  See 
Galveston Daily News, February 8, 1884, p. 4 (“In Chicago and other cities the patent newspaper fiends take the 
early morning newspapers, clip them up before daylight, and in the course of a couple of hours have the pith of the 
news in type for patent insides for country dailies which appear in the afternoon in smaller cities along the lines of 
the railroad that distribute the larger city papers.”)   
89 Oshkosh Daily Northwestern (Oshkosh, WI), February 29, 1884, p.3 (quoting the Cincinnati Enquirer, February 
20, 1884); see The New York Times, February 18, 1884, p. 2 (“The difference in time between points relatively east 
and west in our vast country enable a publisher enable a publisher who chooses to do so to make use of the 
enterprise of others.  Should the thief at a distant point be enabled by the use of the telegraph to steal the property of 
those men who have gone to great care and cost to obtain it?”)  (quoting Henry Watterson, who had been engaged 
by the Associated Process to lobby for a bill to extend copyright to newspapers, see infra note 96 and accompanying 
text).   
90 248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
91 Associated Press also claimed that INS was bribing employees of AP member newspapers to give it AP 
dispatches before they were published.  This scenario, involving unauthorized disclosure of unpublished documents 
that might be considered trade secrets, could in theory also occur without the involvement of the telegraph; one 
newspaper might bribe an employee of its local competitor to pass news stories to it.  The fact that AP has already 
telegraphed the story to many newspapers made tracing a leak more difficult, however, and the fact that INS was 
representing many subscribers rather than a single newspaper would likely increase the amount of the bribe it was 
willing to offer.  
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Without the need for a human intermediary, telegraphed news began to be distributed directly 
and continuously to end-user subscribers, who had such machines installed in their offices, 
shops, hotels, or restaurants.  A competing company could have an employee read a ticker tape 
in a public place or in the office of a conspiring subscriber, and then enter the news dispatches 
into its own distribution system, which would have its own subscribers.  Instead of typesetting 
and printing, the only action required was telegraphic keying or typing, and there were no 
editions on a daily cycle, because the ticker tape ran continuously.  In such circumstances, lead 
time could be cut from hours to a minute or less.92 
 
Although the telegraph did not have as much effect on the traditional cross-town 
newspaper rivalry, ongoing technological developments in typesetting and printing were cutting 
lead time between cross-town rivals, and occasionally the telegraph also had a role to play in 
those situations.  For example, in the 1860s, the San Francisco Bulletin and the Sacramento 
Union had succeeded in excluding other area papers from gaining access to the transcontinental 
telegraph lines, and thus excluded them from direct access to news telegraphed from the East 
Coast.  Another San Francisco paper, the Alta California, waited for the Union to be published in 
Sacramento, and then had an agent telegraph the Union’s news over a Sacramento – San 
Francisco telegraph line.  The Alta eventually convinced the Bulletin and the Union to let it join 
their scheme, but other excluded San Francisco newspapers continued the practice.93   
 
 Third, although communication by telegraph was of great value to many people, it was 
also very expensive.  The initial capital costs of setting up a telegraph line across hundreds or 
thousands of miles could be enormous, and operating and maintenance costs were also 
substantial.  While the newspaper exchange system had been heavily subsidized by the federal 
government through free postal carriage, the telegraph system did not benefit from government 
largesse on such a scale. 
 
Of course, some of the messages carried by telegraph were private and of value only to 
particular individuals or businesses; those individuals or businesses who wanted to send or 
receive them would pay for the privilege.  Other messages, such as timely commodity or stock 
price reports, were particularly valuable to a relatively small group of investors and traders.  
Those individuals and firms would also pay for that information; channels of communication 
could be relatively well-protected against unauthorized tapping; authorized recipients could be 
bound by subscription contracts not to pass it on to others; and enforcement against third parties 
who were inducing breaches of those contracts could be sought under trade secret law. 
 
 That still left a lot of information about current events that was of interest to, and valued 
by, the general public.  How could the cost of gathering and transmitting that information be 
borne by the public, to whom it was of value?  Newspapers had not previously had to face this 
problem, in part because they were often supported as partisan organs by governments and 
political parties, and in part because they enjoyed lead-time advantages over copiers.  If 
                                                 
92 Such facts formed the basis of the dispute in National Telegraph News Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 119 
F. 294 (7th Cir. 1902). 
93 See Barbara Cloud, News: Public Service or Profitable Property?, 13 American Journalism 141, 144 (1996) (citing 
Robert J. Chandler, “The California News-Telegraph Monopoly, 1860-1870,” 58 Southern California Quarterly 459 
(1976)). 
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technological developments cut lead time, social developments cut political patronage.  It is not 
within the scope of this paper to trace those complicated social developments.  It is clear, 
however, that during the middle decades of the nineteenth century, newspapers moved 
dramatically away from political parties, and began to rely much more on sales and advertising 
for revenue.94  One might therefore see the adoption by Congress in 1846 of a low-bid system for 
awarding printing contracts as signaling the end of an era.95 
 
Thus, arguably, the decline of patronage and lead time left news organizations to deal 
with a classic problem of appropriability.96  Of course, as we will see, opponents of protection 
for the news strongly disputed the existence of such a problem, and the issue whether any 
particular level of protection for news or newspapers would optimize the production of news is 
beyond the scope of this paper.  It is clear, however, that some news organizations sought to 
convince Congress and the courts of the existence of an appropriability problem; that they had a 
plausible story to tell; and that developments in communications technology made possible a 
new business model for journalism – the selling or licensing of news stories, rather than informal 
exchange and sharing – that was more difficult to put into practice without some legal protection 
for news. 
 
 IV: Efforts to Protect News in Congress and the Courts and the Rise of Creativity-
Based Originality Rhetoric.   
 
 During the 1880s and 1890s, news organizations like the Associated Press and Western 
Union (which, although mainly a telegraph company, made occasional forays into the news 
dissemination business) attempted to gain legal protection for news in both the Congress and the 
courts.  The one serious attempt in Congress took place in 1884.  This article will argue that the 
most important attempt in the courts culminated in a federal court of appeals decision in 1902.  
In both cases, this paper will argue, those attempts led to the articulation of a creativity-based 
view of the originality requirement in copyright.   
 
A. The News Copyright Bill of 1884.  In late 1883, the Associated Press sent Henry 
Watterson to Washington, D.C. to seek passage of a bill that would grant short-term protection to 
articles published in newspapers.97  Watterson was the founder and editor of the Louisville 
Courier-Journal; he had served a partial term in the U.S. House of Representatives in 1876 and 
1877, having been elected to serve out the remaining term of a Kentucky Congressman who had 
died in office.   
 
On March 4, 1884, Senator John Sherman of Ohio introduced “A Bill Granting Copyright 
in Newspapers.”98 Six days later, Representative John Randolph Tucker of Virginia introduced 
                                                 
94 These developments are traced in Gerald J. Baldasty, supra note 70, at 36-58. 
95 See id. at 42. 
96 On the problem of appropriating gains from innovation and information, see, e.g., Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, 
Socialism, and Democracy (1950); Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for 
invention, in R. Nelson, The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity 609 (1962). 
97 Henry Watterson, Marse Henry: An Autobiography, vol. II, p. 104 (1919) [available on Google Books]. 
98 S. 1728, 48th Cong., see 15 Cong. Rec. 1578.  The full text of the bill was:  
A Bill Granting Copyright to Newspapers 
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an identical bill in the House.99  The bills sought to grant newspapers and newspaper associations 
“the sole right to print, issue and sell for the term of eight hours, dating from the hour of going to 
press, the contents of [the] newspaper, or the collected news of said newspaper association, 
exceeding one hundred words.”100 Thus, the rights were granted directly to the newspaper or the 
association, rather than to the author of the contents;101 and they were good for eight hours from 
going to press. 
 
Newspapers across the United States quickly learned of the bill, and devoted their own 
column space to engaging in vigorous debate about it.  The opponents of the news copyright bill 
sent scores of petitions to Congress.  Entries in the Congressional Record document the receipt 
of at least 60 separate petitions in opposition, received from citizens of at least 19 of the 38 states 
then in the Union, and of the Dakota Territory.102  Many of those petitions have been preserved 
in the National Archives.103  Most of the petitions opposing the bills were sent on identical 
printed forms with blank spaces to be filled in with the name, newspaper affiliation, and address 
of the petitioner, which suggests that there was organized opposition to the bills. By contrast, 
Congress apparently received only one petition in favor of the bill, though that was from the 
Southern Press Association, which represented 22 newspaper members.104  
 
The bill divided newspapers along four overlapping fault lines.  First and most 
prominently, it divided the “metropolitan” papers – big-city papers with large circulations that 
could afford to hire their own reporting staffs and to pay to belong to a news association and 
                                                                                                                                                             
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress 
assembled, That any daily or weekly newspaper or any association of daily or weekly newspapers, 
published in the United States, or any of the Territories thereof, shall have the sole right to print, issue and 
sell for the term of eight hours dating from the hour of going to press, the contents of said daily or weekly 
newspaper, or the collected news of said newspaper association exceeding one hundred words. 
Section 2.  That for any infringement of the copyright granted by the first section of this Act, the party 
injured may sue in any court of competent jurisdiction, and recover in any proper action the damages 
sustained by him from the person making the infringement, together with the costs of suit. 
Two other copyright bills that have sometimes been mistakenly identified as being related to these are H.R. 7341, 
47th Cong., 2d Sess. (introduced Jan. 23, 1883) (Cong. Rec. p. 286), and  H.R. 62, 48th Cong., see 15 Cong. Rec. 60 
(1883).  These bills were both entitled “A bill giving copyrights under certain conditions to journalistic articles.” 
However, they were not concerned with granting copyright to newspapers.  Instead, they would have allowed a 
writer whose work had initially been published in an uncopyrighted newspaper to obtain copyright under certain 
conditions (the conditions included “caus[ing] to be published six times, in the journal or periodical in which said 
articles originally appeared . . . a notice that [the author] had acquired such copyright protection.”     
99 H.R. 5850, 48th Cong., see 15 Cong. Rec. 1758. 
100 Id. Apparently, drafts of the bill before it was introduced had set the period of exclusivity at 48 hours, and then at 
24 hours, before settling on the period of eight hours.  See The Saturday Evening Observer, Dunkirk, NY, March 15, 
1884, p.1.   
101 In committee hearings on the bill, one of the questions raised was whether Congress had the power under the 
constitution to grant rights directly to newspapers, since the Copyright Clause refers only to a power to grant 
exclusive rights to Authors.  See The Galveston Daily News, March 20, 1884.  
102 See 15 Cong. Rec. 111 (1884) (index listing all of the entries for petitions relating to the bills). 
103 They are located in Record Group 233, in folders HR 48A – H 12.5 (Committee on the Judiciary) and HR 48A – 
H 21.3 (Committee on Patents); and in Record Group 46, in folders S 48A – H 14 (Committee on the Library) and S 
48A – J6 (Tabled Petitions)..  
104 See id.  It is not clear how supportive of the bill the members of the Southern Press Association actually were.  
The Atlanta Constitution was a member of the Association, but it published a number of statements in opposition to 
the bills.  See The Atlanta Constitution,  March 14, 1884, p. 4; The Atlanta Constitution, March 25, 1884, p. 4. 
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receive telegraph dispatches – from the “country press,” small-town papers that continued to rely 
heavily on borrowed material to fill their pages.  To the metropolitan papers like the New York 
Times, “the country newspapers [were] beneath the rule of men with whom the scissors are 
mightier than the pen”; it and the other metropolitans were victims of the typical “rural editor,” 
who had to “loo[k] back over a career of small piracies.”105  The country press agreed that the 
news copyright bill pitted them against the metropolitans, but cast the bill in a negative light.  It 
was, according to the Newark Daily Advocate (Newark, Ohio), “a monopoly scheme to force the 
readers in the smaller towns to depend for their news upon the metropolitan press ring, to the 
exclusion of the home journals.”106 As the editor of the Elizabeth Journal (of Elizabeth, New 
Jersey) argued, “the result of passing such a bill would be to cripple the local press of New 
Jersey and place the people of that state at the mercy of the New York and Philadelphia papers, 
which have no interest in the welfare of the small New Jersey towns, and no space in which to 
discuss the local interests of the numerous places in which they are constantly seeking to 
encroach upon the preserves of the local press.”107  
 
Second, the news copyright bills set the Associated Press and its members (many of 
whom were the “metropolitan” papers) against the members of the United Press -- at that time a 
two-year-old competitor of the AP108 -- and against independent papers that were not members of 
either association.  The United Press did not itself publicly oppose the bills,109 but some of its 
prominent members did,110 and the opposition to the bill was often tied to animosity towards the 
“monopolies” of the Associated Press and the Western Union.111   
 
Third, the bill set afternoon papers, which were often accused of lifting material from 
morning-paper competitors, against the morning papers that were the alleged victims of the 
                                                 
105 The New York Times, Feb. 2, 1884, p. 4. 
106 Newark Daily Advocate (Newark, Ohio), February 19, 1884, p. 1 See Newark Daily Advocate (Newark, Ohio), 
January 26, 1884, p. 1 (“The object is to promote the circulation of the large metropolitan papers by prohibiting the 
reproduction of news in the journals of the smaller towns and cities while it still has news value.”). 
107 Oshkosh Daily Northwestern (Oshkosh, WI), February 26, 1884, p. 2.; also reported in Newark Daily Advocate 
(Newark, OH), Feb. 25, 1884, p. 1. 
108 See Richard A. Schwarzlose, The Nation’s Newsbrokers, Vol. II, p. 133, p. 248 table 1 (UP had grown from 
“barely one hundred subscribers” in 1882 to 166 subscribers in 1884; AP had 425 subscribers in 1883).   
Schwarzlose portrays the news copyright bill as an effort of the AP to “tackl[e] the UP competition.” Id. at 135. 
109 United Press likely thought that opposition to the bill would cast it in a bad light: “Some opposition was 
apprehended from the United Press from the supposition being that that organization was to some extent dependent 
on the published reports of the Associated Press, but not a word in the way of a demurrer has come from that 
organization, its managers holding that it suffered more from the pilfering of its news by the Associated Press papers 
than it is benefitted by its having access to the Associated Press reports after they are in print.”  Newark Daily 
Advocate (Newark, OH), Feb. 25, 1884, p. 1. 
110 See, e.g., Boston Daily Globe, March 27, 1884, p.2 (criticizing the news copyright bill and predicting that it 
would fail: “We are inclined to believe that the Associate Press will have to take its chances with the rest of the 
journalistic world in getting the news.”); Richard A. Schwarzlose, The Nation’s Newsbrokers, supra note 107, p. 
133 (describing the Boston Globe as a “mainstay” of the United Press) 
111 See, e.g., Newark Daily Advocate (Newark, OH), Mar. 3, 1884, p. 1.  The Daily Advocate quoted a speech by 
Rep. John Anderson of Kansas at length.  Rep. Anderson railed against the monopoly of the Western Union, are 
argued that it should be nationalized; portrayed Associated Press editors as “censors” whose power to affect public 
debate dwarfed that of the President as a “tempest” did a “baby’s breath”; and concluded by railing against the news 
copyright bill, which would extend the power of the Western Union over the country press.  Id.  
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borrowing.112 Similarly and fourthly, it set East Coast papers, which were the first to go to press 
every day, against western papers located in time zones that lagged one to three hours behind the 
East Coast, putting them in a position to borrow material from published East Coast papers. 
 
For purposes of this article, the important thing about this debate is to note how 
opponents of the bill contested it, and how supporters defended it.  One of the most prominent 
arguments used against the bill articulated and depended upon a creativity-based view of 
originality.  For example, the printed petition against the bill, copies of which were sent by 
dozens of newspaper editors to Congress, asked “What is news? The statement of facts, the 
history of current events.  Can any one create or invent a fact or event? If he cannot create or 
invent a fact or event, how can he copyright it?”113   Similarly, the Newark Daily Advocate of 
Newark, Ohio reported a speech by Representative John Anderson of Kansas, railing against the 
bills: “While there may be a possible ground for copyrighting the editorial, as the product of the 
editor’s brain, what ground is there for copyrighting, say, election returns, or the news of 
Garfield’s murder!  Does the editor create them in the sense that an author creates a book?  In my 
mind the measure is a glaring wrong, glittering with impertinence . . . .”114 
 
Almost two decades after Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co, Inc.,115 
the contention that facts are not copyrightable because they aren’t created by authors appears 
perfectly familiar to us.  Yet in 1884, existing case law and treatises did not contain such 
reasoning.  Courts and treatise writers uniformly supported the view that a work which presented 
facts that had been gathered by observation of the world should be protected under copyright 
law.  However, they had not been faced with the issue of protecting facts about current events – 
news.  To opponents of the news copyright bill, news seemed different, and they hoped that they 
could convince Congress it was.   
 
News seemed different in several respects.  First, current events did not seem to be a 
suitable subject for methodical, sustained study.  Map and chart makers went on surveying 
expeditions using special tools to measure distances that would eventually be represented in their 
maps or charts.  Authors of directories systematically canvassed neighborhoods or institutions.     
By contrast, events that formed the basis of the news could often not be predicted in advance, 
and thus it seemed fortuitous that a particular person would learn of a newsworthy event. As an 
article in February 21, 1884 issue of The Nation, commenting on the newspaper copyright bill, 
put it: 
                                                 
112 See, e.g., Galveston Daily News, February 17, 1884, p. 2.  “[T]he smaller morning dailies . . . are just able to 
take the state report of Associated Press matter and a few specials, are naturally somewhat badly affected when an 
afternoon pirate springs up beside them and takes nearly all they are able to give by an expenditure serious enough 
to them in their circumstances, and puts his subscription price lower than it could be if he paid part of the price for 
the telegrams.  The pirate can sometimes run the local morning paper hard enough to keep it poor, and thus keep 
readers from obtaining as good a paper as they would otherwise have in their town.” 
113 Petition, The News Copyright Bill.  (Copies of this form petition, as signed by representatives of many different  
newspapers, can be found in all of the folders cited above in note 102.) This language is echoed by The Evening 
Observer, Dunkirk, NY, the editor of which must have either read or wrote the petition: “What is news?  The 
statement of facts, the history or current events.  Can anyone create or invent a fact?  Unquestionably not.  What 
therefore are the reasonable grounds for a copyright?”  The Evening Observer, Dunkirk, NY, April 3, 1884, p.2.,       
114 Newark Daily Advocate (Newark, OH), Mar. 3, 1884, p. 1.   
115 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
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[I]t is absurd to talk of a man who picks up a piece of news or an “item” as an “author” at 
all.  The reason why copyright laws are passed is to secure the fruits of original, 
intellectual labor.  But the proposed copyright in “news” does not do this.  Any one may 
collect news without any original intellectual effort, and with very little effort of any 
kind.  Some people do it by listening at keyholes, most people in the ordinary course of 
conversation with the persons whom they meet in the way of business or pleasure.  If a 
collector of news in London telegraphs to New York that . . . Lord Cairns has offered 
Miss Fortescue £10,000 to release his son from his marriage engagement, who is the 
person whose “property” in the news ought to be protected, or who is the “author” of 
it?116 
 
This view of how news was gathered – “in the ordinary course of conversation with the persons 
whom they meet in the way of business or pleasure” – was outdated even in 1884.  Newspapers 
and news associations had already begun to employ reporters to go out and find news, not just to 
report whatever they happened to hear in casual conversations.  And, of course, much of the 
investment was not in finding news, but in transmitting it quickly over great distances.  Yet this 
image that news was acquired largely by chance was quite powerful, and fit in well with the 
argument that copyright required intellectual labor that was missing in newsgathering. 
 
 Second, fact-based works that were already protected under copyright law – maps, 
directories, calendars, road-books, and the like – were rarely in narrative form.  Rather, they 
presented information in the form of lists, charts, maps, and the like.  Not all news in newspapers 
was presented in narrative form; stock prices and weather reports weren’t, for example.  Both 
sides in the news copyright debate, however, assumed that much of what the bill would protect 
would be news stories – literary works in narrative form.  This presented a new issue – how 
should copyright law deal with factual material presented in narrative form?  For narrative 
literary works, copyright law already had developed a distinction between form and content.117   
Thus, in Stowe v. Thomas,118 Justice Grier wrote: “A ‘copy’ of a book must, therefore, be a 
transcript of the language in which the conceptions of the author are clothed; of something 
printed and embodied in a tangible shape. The same conceptions clothed in another language 
cannot constitute the same composition, nor can it be called a transcript or ‘copy’ of the same 
‘book.’”119   
 
Both opponents and proponents of the newspaper copyright bill seemed to proceed from 
the assumption that copyright in newspapers would only protect the literal language of a news 
                                                 
116 The Nation, Volume 38, n. 973 (February 21, 1884), p. 159. 
117 Another way to illuminate this difference draws on Jane Ginsburg’s distinction between “high authorship” and 
“low authorship” works.  See Ginsburg, supra note 22, at 1866-1870.  “High authorship” – the manifestation of a 
“personal authorial presence” – is much more easily accomplished or perceived in works of literary narration.  Lists, 
maps and the like are much more likely to be associated with “low authorship.”  Of course, it is an illusion to think 
that lists of numbers and names are bereft of personal interpretation. As Justin Hughes has pointed out, there may be 
plenty of interpretation in numbers --  one person’s notion of whether to divide a population count into Caucasians 
and Negroes, and how to count them, might be quite different from another’s.  See Justin Hughes, Created Facts and 
the Flawed Ontology of Copyright Law, 83 Notre Dame L. R. 43, 53-54 (2007). 
118 23 F. Cas. 201 (1853) (No. 13, 514). 
119 Id. at 207. 
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story, and that any newspaper editor would be able to rewrite the story so that it recounted the 
same facts but avoided infringement liability. For the Atlanta Constitution, which opposed the 
newspaper copyright bill, this meant that the bill would be ineffectual: “Neither facts nor 
incidents can be copyrighted, but only the form in which they are presented.  This is no remedy 
at all, for the papers that steal their news would not be balked by the copyright of form merely, 
and this is all that any copyright can cover.”120  For the Galveston Daily News, which supported 
the bill, this meant that the bill would not give anyone a monopoly over news, but would stop 
newspapers from literal copying: “Copyright would protect a telegram or other matter in the 
form in which it appears.  It would not prevent any writer from making in his own words a 
statement of the facts alleged in the telegram.  The so-called newspapers that feed on other 
newspapers would either have to dismiss the scissors brigade and do some writing instead of 
clipping, or they would have to make arrangements with the Associated Press for its matter, if 
they wanted it within twenty-four hours.”121 
 
Interestingly, the Dunkirk (N.Y.) Evening Observer, a staunch opponent of the bill, made 
a rare direct mention of the existing copyright protection for directories, but it then distinguished 
news stories, without elaborating: “It is supposed by some that because . . . a city directory may 
be copyrighted, therefore news dispatches may be also; and so they may, so far as the original 
wording or form of dispatch is concerned, but the information contained in the dispatches cannot 
be, and any attempt to prevent the free use of such information will lead to litigation and result in 
failure.”122          
 
 Third, news was important to the political and cultural life of the country, and to political 
and cultural speech, in a way that directories and maps weren’t.  As the Milwaukee Sentinel put 
it, “[news] becomes a matter of common information as soon as it is printed, and men may 
spread it by word of mouth or may write to one another about it . . . . To prevent other journals 
from commenting upon it is to stifle free discussion, and to permit them to comment is to permit 
them to republish the matter.”123  The concern about freedom of the press was particularly 
pointed in light of the size and power of the Associated Press – many were sure that the practical 
result of the news copyright bill would be, not the decentralized sale and purchase of news 
stories by many newspapers, but further concentration of the news business.  As The Evening 
Observer (Dunkirk, NY) put it, “The Sherman copyright bill [is] designed to create a monopoly 
of newsgathering.  It was instigated and was backed by the associated press and the metropolitan 
newspapers.  The associated press is the worst kind of a monopoly, and yet additional protection 
                                                 
120 The Atlanta Constitution, March 20, 1884, p. 4.  Five days later, the Constitution quoted from a lecture by James 
Whitney, a New York attorney, to the same effect:  “[I]t is only the “writings” of an author which congress is 
authorized by the constitution to protect.  There can be no copyright on news alone, the copyright must be on the 
verbal form. . . [I]t would be  . . . easy to abridge or put the ideas or information in totally different and original 
language, and this would constitute a new and distinct writing, independent of the other, and which the other could 
not reach.”  The Atlanta Constitution, March 25, 1884, p. 4. 
121 Galveston Daily News, February 17, 1884, p. 2. 
122 Dunkirk (N.Y.) Evening Observer, p. 4. 
123 Milwaukee Sentinel, February 22, 1884, p. 4.  Of course, one might use the doctrine of fair use to allow 
commentary on a copyrighted news article, but that would be unlikely to comfort the writer in the Sentinel:  the non-
categorical, case-specific nature of fair use doctrine would make it difficult for newspapers to know in advance 
which uses would be protected and which wouldn’t, and could lead them to shy away from any use that could 
conceivably generate litigation.         
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is asked for!  . . . We cannot understand how a monopoly of newsgathering can in any way 
advantage the people.”124  The Associated Press was supposed to be neutral, but Menaham 
Blondheim has argued that its selection of news items was actually biased in favor of the 
Republican Party and against the Democrats,125 and it was also not above agreeing to refrain 
from any criticism of the Western Union Telegraph Company, in return for favorable access to 
telegraph lines and a promise that Western Union would not itself enter the news business.126  
   
 Fourth, with works such as directories and maps, application of a “market substitute” 
doctrine of infringement could accommodate the most pressing concerns about free speech while 
protecting the core economic interests of copyright owners.  Directories and maps documented 
large numbers of names, addresses, geographical relationships, and the like, and were bought as 
reference works.  Purchasers would consult them many times over an extended period, and 
would likely consult different parts of the works at different times. That market for reference 
works was only endangered if a copier reproduced all or a substantial portion of a work.  Thus, in 
the market for reference works a “market substitute” doctrine would leave room for the kind of 
copying that authors who did not set out to duplicate the work in question were likely to want to 
do.  An author would be free to use and incorporate a single directory entry or some information 
incorporated on a map without fear of infringement. 
 
  Newspapers were different, however.  Each daily edition was modest in size, and its 
market value was short-lived.  People often bought the daily paper to read the lead story about 
some sensational event, and then discarded it.  Subsequent authors might well want to repeat the 
essential facts of that lead story.  Under these circumstances, the “market substitute” doctrine had 
much less maneuvering room to mediate between the economic interests of the copyright owner 
and the interests of the reader in speaking freely about what he or she had learned.  The situation 
was even worse with news tickers, which dispensed content in a continuous stream, making it 
difficult to identify a “work” of any size greater than a single news item. 
 
 In light of these conditions, the logic that lay behind the intellectual-labor view of 
originality, and the consequent protection of fact-based works, probably seemed quaint to the 
opponents of the news copyright bill, and the “market substitute” infringement doctrine did not 
seem to offer any clear relief.  Were the events that formed the basis of news reports “common 
sources of information open to all”?  Once one heard of the report of an event, it was too late to 
go witness it oneself – time had moved forward – and those who did witness it were already 
dispersing.  Moreover, the means of transmitting the report from the distant site of the event to 
one’s own location were not open on equal terms to all: the Western Union owned the telegraph 
lines, and it offered the Associated Press special terms.  Thus, maps, directories, and news 
reports might be equated at some abstract level, but they did not seem similar when placed in 
their concrete social context.      
 
 In the end, the news copyright bill died.  The New York Times had predicted that the 
political influence of the country press, widespread throughout the Union, could decide the issue: 
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“If country members of Congress are instructed by their constituents that the news copyright bill 
is a defense for metropolitan journals, (as is very likely the case,) the country members will 
defeat the bill beyond peradventure.”127 The “country members” never got to vote on the bill; it 
was reported out of the Committee of the Library with a recommendation that it not pass, and 
was allowed to disappear quietly.128   
 
B.  Seeking Protection for News in the Courts.   By the late spring of 1884, the 
Associated Press realized that its quest to obtain legislative protection for news was going to be 
futile.  From the vantage point of 1919, Henry Watterson looked back on his trip to Washington 
to lobby for the bill as a “fool’s errand.”129  But the legislature wasn’t the only forum in which 
the Associate Press could pursue protection for news.  Watterson recounted that while he was in 
Washington, “a learned but dissolute lawyer said to me, “You need no act of Congress to protect 
your news service.  There are at least two, and I think four or five, English rulings that cover the 
case.  Let me show them to you.’”130  Watterson then commented, “To a recent date the 
Associated Press has relied on these decisions under the common law of England.”131  
Watterson no doubt received this advice before he testified in front of the House Committee 
on the Judiciary on March 24, 1884, because his testimony on that occasion featured the 
argument that English courts had already decided in favor of copyright for news.132  Watterson 
relied principally on Vice Chancellor Sir Richard Malins’s133 opinion in the 1869 English Court 
of Chancery case of Cox v. Land and Water Journal Company.134  Cox was in more than one 
respect a great case for Watterson and the interests that he represented.  Mr. Cox, the plaintiff, 
was the proprietor of a newspaper called the Field.  The Field had published a directory of hunts 
in the United Kingdom which included “the name of each hunt, with the nearest town convenient 
for strangers, the number of the hounds in the pack, the hunting days, the names of the masters, 
huntsmen, and whips, and the address of the kennel.”135 The defendant had copied that list from 
the Field and published it in another periodical, the Land and Water Journal.  The court held for 
the plaintiff, finding that he had a right to the material that he had invested in collecting.  Of 
course, a directory of hunts is not a news story.  However, the Cox court posed a hypothetical 
that did involve news, and that involved a scenario that was particularly relevant to telegraph 
news services like Watterson’s Associated Press: 
Now, suppose, for instance, the proprietor of a newspaper employs a correspondent 
abroad, and that correspondent, being employed and sent abroad at great expense, makes 
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communications to a newspaper which are highly appreciated by the public, can it be said 
that another newspaper, published, perhaps, in the evening of the same day, may take and 
publish those communications in extenso, with or without acknowledgment?136   
It was clear that the question was rhetorical, and the answer was supposed to be “no”; that 
was exactly the answer the news agencies wanted.   
The major contemporary treatises also presented the law on copyright in news in terms that 
were favorable to news agencies.  In the 1881 Second Edition of his already well-established 
English treatise, Walter Copinger stated that “there can of course by copyright in telegrams,”137 
and cited in support of this statement a recent Australian case, Wilson v. Luke.138  According to 
Copinger, “[i]t was argued for the defendant [in Wilson] that, as the telegrams were matters of 
news, any one could re-publish them without breach of the Copyright Act; but Mr. Justice 
Molesworth held that the plaintiff had a property in the telegrams, and that no one could re-
publish them without the permission of the person to whom they had been sent in the first 
instance.”139    
An 1891 treatise, Fisher and Strahan’s The Law of the Press,140 framed the issue with 
exquisite clarity, and also decided it in favor of news agencies.  “No doubt there is copyright in 
the literary form given to news,”141 wrote Fisher and Strahan.  “The difficulty is whether there is 
copyright in the substance of the news.”142 They considered that issue at some length, and 
concluded that “on the principle that applies to the cases of Directories and Lists of judgments, 
we are inclined to believe that there is.” 143 
It is difficult to see what distinction can be made between the skill and labour necessary 
to collect the news of a district and the skill and labour necessary to collect the names and 
residences of the inhabitants of a district, or to compile a list of the judgments recovered in a 
district.  In all three cases the material on which the result is based is common to the world, 
and two persons working accurately on that material would produce practically the same 
result, and the result would be a statement of facts.144 
In support of their conclusion, Fisher and Strahan cited both Cox and Wilson, the cases 
mentioned earlier by Watterson and Copinger.  
In spite of those cases and commentary, however, the news agencies still faced a problem 
under U.S. copyright law.  The Field, the newspaper at issue in Cox v. Land and Water Journal 
Company, had not been registered, but relying on a somewhat doubtful interpretation of English 
law, Vice Chancellor Malins granted relief to the plaintiff anyway.145  In 1881, that interpretation 
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was pointedly questioned in Walter v. Howe,146 which held that newspapers did need to be 
registered to be protected under English copyright law. The holding in Walter was later followed 
by two 1889 cases, which confirmed that there would be no protection of newspapers without 
registration.147  In England, however, there was a special registration provision for periodicals, 
which allowed the owner of copyright in the periodical to register just once for the entire series; 
that registration was good so long as the periodical maintained regular publication.148      
The U.S. Copyright Act did not contain any special registration provision for works 
published in series.  It continued to require registration for each separately published work 
covered under the Act.  Daily newspapers continued not to register their individual issues as they 
were published; and if under certain circumstances telegraph dispatches themselves were going 
to count as publications, they would face even greater difficulties meeting the registration 
requirement. Thus, news agencies needed a legal strategy for avoiding the registration 
requirement under U.S. copyright law. 
This issue came to a head in 1901, when Western Union sued a company called the 
National Telegraph News Company.  Western Union had itself entered the news business, in a 
limited fashion.  It had purchased the Gold & Stock Telegraph Company, which owned the rights 
to an early telegraph ticker machine, and had continued the Gold & Stock business of providing 
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news service directly to ticker machines.  Those tickers were installed in hotels, saloons, and 
private companies that wanted “instant information of passing events of more or less importance 
throughout the world,” and sometimes, in particular, news of sporting events, no doubt of special 
interest to gamblers and bookmakers.149   The National Telegraph News Company had a 
competing business of providing a news service through tickers.  It admitted that it had been 
copying news items from the Western Union tickers, and sending them out on its own wires, “so 
that within a very few minutes from the time th[e] news appears upon the tapes of the [Western 
Union] tickers it re-appears upon the tapes of the [National Telegraph News Company] 
tickers.”150   Western Union argued that the National Telegraph News Company charged less for 
its subscriptions because it had no expenses for gathering news, and that Western Union had 
been forced to lower its prices to retain subscribers.151 
Western Union obtained a preliminary injunction from the District Court that prohibited 
National Telegraph News from using any news items it had gathered from Western Union tickers 
for 60 minutes after they appeared on those tickers.  National Telegraph News appealed.  
National’s chief argument on appeal was that Western Union had published the ticker tapes 
without registration, notice, or deposit, and had therefore abandoned common-law copyright in 
them without acquiring copyright under federal law.152  Western Union decided to argue that the 
reports that it transmitted to the tickers were not copyrightable subject matter under federal law, 
and hence that federal requirements of registration, notice and deposit upon publication did not 
apply: 
[W]e respectfully protest at the outset, and in the holy name of arts and letters, that the 
reports of passing events sent over [Western Union] tickers to saloons, hotels and 
brokers’ offices, is not, properly speaking, literature; that it does not come within the 
purview of the copyright statutes; that would not be entitled to the protection of such 
statutes even if every condition precedent prescribed by them had been punctiliously 
complied with; and that it would not, therefore, be subject to diminution because of any 
failure to comply therewith.153 
Why were the reports not copyrightable subject matter?  Western Union cited the old 1829 case 
of Clayton v. Stone,154 and argued as Justice Thompson had in Clayton that the ticker reports 
provided only “a history of inconsequential contemporaneous events which adds nothing to the 
learning of the world.”155  However, perhaps aware that Clayton had not remained a strong 
precedent, it also argued that news was not copyrightable because it was not the product of any 
author: “Could you call the writer of [a telegraph message giving the result of a baseball match 
or a horse-race, or the fluctuations of the stock market] an ‘author?’ The very absurdity of the 
proposition is its own refutation.”156   Thus, a prominent force in the news industry, Western 
Union, had itself decided to adopt a creativity-based view of originality to avoid a charge of 
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abandonment and forfeiture of copyright protection, and to try its luck arguing that common law 
still protected its reports. 
 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction, and Judge Peter Grosscup wrote 
an opinion that provides a pioneering, astoundingly clear use of the rhetoric of creativity-based 
originality, and of the associated notion of the romantic author.  “Authorship,” he wrote, “implies 
that there has been put into the production something meritorious from the author’s own mind; 
that the product embodies the thought of the author, as well as the thought of others; and would 
not have found existence in the form presented, but for the distinctive individuality of mind from 
which it sprang.”157   News reports, he concluded, did not usually bear the stamp of a particular 
mind, and therefore were not the products of an author that copyright law should protect. 
 A mere annal . . . is the reduction to copy of an event that others, in a like situation, 
would have observed; and its statement in the substantial form that people generally 
would have adopted. . . . [I]f . . . writings are a mere notation of the figures at which 
stocks or cereals have been sold, or of the result of a horse race, or base-ball game, they 
cannot be said to bear the impress of individuality, and fail, therefore, to rise to the plane 
of authorship.  In authorship, the product has some likeness to the mind underneath it; in 
a work of mere notation, the mind is guide only to the fingers that make the notation.  
One is the product of originality; the other the product of opportunity.158      
Nevertheless, Grosscup and his brethren held, the news service provided by Western Union has a 
commercial and social value that deserves legal protection – it is a “modern enterprise – one of 
the distinctive achievements of our day – which, combining the genius and accumulations of 
men, with the forces of electricity, combs the earth’s surface, each day, for what the day has 
brought forth, that whatever befalls the sons of men shall come, almost instantaneously, into the 
consciousness of mankind.”159  Thus, the court upheld the injunction on common-law grounds.  
The release of National Telegraph News decision marks a significant moment in American 
copyright history.  For the first time, a federal court concluded that a large category of products 
of intellectual labor – news accounts that were “mere annals” – was not copyrightable subject 
matter, on the basis of a creativity-based interpretation of the originality requirement. 
 
C. Parallels and Effects: The Context and Aftermath of the Newspaper Copyright 
Bill Debate and the National Telegraph News Decision.  The debate over the Newspaper 
Copyright Bill and the National Telegraph News litigation were not the only fora in which 
copyright law was faced with the increasing desire of newspapers for protection of their 
investments in newsgathering.  English jurists had to deal with the same trend, and Walter 
Copinger’s treatise on copyright law, of which new editions were regularly being published 
during the era – 1870, 1881, 1893, 1904, and 1915 – provides an interesting glimpse of 
developments.  The First and Second Editions of Copinger’s treatise, published in 1870 and 
1881, do not reject copyright in news; if anything, the Second Edition, as noted above, tends 
toward supporting it.160  In 1893, however, the Third Edition makes a break.  Copinger states: 
“There can be little doubt but that there is copyright in the literary form given to news – not in 
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the substance of the news itself, but in the form in which it is conveyed. . . . One newspaper 
cannot legally use the telegrams sent to another, but we are not able to go so far as to admit 
copyright in the substance of the news as distinguished from the form of language by which that 
substance is conveyed.”161 Interestingly enough, however, he cites no authority for this position – 
the statement appears to be no more than Copinger’s own opinion. 
The 1904 Fourth Edition of Copinger’s treatise, written by J.M. Easton, retained the 
Third Edition passage quoted above, but Easton added a citation to the 1892 decision of the 
Court of Chancery in Walter v. Steinkopff.162  In Walter, the St. James Gazette had copied several 
items from the Times, most prominently excerpts of a piece by Rudyard Kipling on America.  
When the Times sued, the Gazette set up as one defense an established custom of borrowing 
between newspapers, which it described in some detail.  No doubt this custom had in fact existed 
in England, just as it had in the United States.  Yet Sir Frederick North, who decided the case, 
held that such a custom had no legal effect.  Then came the passage that supported the statement 
in Copinger’s treatise: “It is said that there is no copyright in news. But there is or may be 
copyright in the particular forms of language or modes of expression by which information is 
conveyed . . . .”163  And, decided North, the Gazette had copied those forms of language from the 
Times.  Notably, North presents the statement that there is no copyright in news in the passive 
case, without citations, and hence without any attribution.  It sounds as though North may be 
stating a universally recognized truth, and yet, along with Copinger’s contemporaneous Third 
Edition statement, similarly floated without authority, it is among the first articulations of the 
principle that there can be no copyright in news, and the nascent fact/expression doctrine.      
Back in the United States, both the debate on the Newspaper Copyright Bill and the 
National Telegraph News decision influenced commentators and courts. In his 1912 book 
Copyright: Its History and Its Law, Richard Rogers Bowker contended that the failure to pass the 
Newspaper Copyright Bill meant that there was no copyright protection for news, but only for 
the literary form in which it was recounted: 
A bill to protect news for twenty-four hours was at one time before Congress, but 
was never passed.  There is, therefore, no copyright protection for news as such, but the 
general copyright of the newspaper or a special copyright may protect the form of a 
dispatch, letter or article containing news.164 
Bowker then noted that the National Telegraph News case provided common-law protection for 
news on ticker tapes.165  The following year, the Southern District of New York cited the Bowker 
account with approval in support of a broad statement that facts were not copyrightable: “[T]here 
can be no piracy of facts, because facts are public property,”166 stated Judge Hough; he then 
opined that “a fair summary of the law on [the impossibility of copyrighting news] is, I think, 
contained in Bowker on Copyright, pp. 88, 89.”167  The case proceeded to hold that fiction 
presented as news should also be uncopyrightable, essentially adopting a theory of estoppel. 
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 In his 1917 copyright law treatise,168 Arthur William Weil quoted extensive passages 
from National Telegraph News, which he praised as “an extremely able opinion.”169  In 
particular, Weil quoted approvingly the passage from National Telegraph News denying 
copyright to “mere annals” while criticizing Justice Holmes’s apparent acceptance of the 
copyrightability of directories in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.170  In the same year, 
William B. Hale, whose copyright treatise was published as volume 13 of Corpus Juris,171 cited 
National Telegraph News in support of two related propositions: that there is no copyright in 
news,172 but that there is common-law protection of news, which is not destroyed by publication 
because news is not literary property.173   
 1917 is also the year that Judge Augustus Hand issued the District Court decision in 
Associated Press v. International News Service.174  This litigation, of course, culminated in the 
Supreme Court’s decision in International News Service v. Associated Press175 the following 
year.  The Supreme Court’s recognition of a property right in news in this litigation has been 
widely recognized and extensively analyzed.  The role of the INS case in establishing that news 
is not copyrightable, however, has received somewhat less emphasis.  Judge Hand’s opinion 
decision directly addressed the policy question – should news be given some post-publication 
protection? – with little discussion of the legal issue of how to avoid dedication to the public 
under the federal copyright scheme, which by that time had dropped the registration requirement, 
but still required proper notice upon publication.176  
As for the issue of post-publication protection for news, Hand announced that he was 
“personally satisfied . . . that the right exists to prevent the sale by a competing news agency of 
news which is taken from early publications of complainant’s members before sufficient time 
has elapsed to afford opportunity for general publication.”177 In support of such a proposition, 
Hand rested heavily on National Telegraph News, and his opinion contained a three-paragraph, 
700-word quote from Judge Grosscup’s opinion in that case.178  Yet Judge Hand concluded that 
the legal issue was not sufficiently free from doubt to grant a preliminary injunction prohibiting 
copying altogether. Rather, he issued a preliminary injunction that only forbade INS from 
inducing agents of the Associated Press, or of its member newspapers, to furnish it with news in 
breach of AP policy. That meant that INS was still free to obtain published copies of East Coast 
newspapers and transmit that news to West Coast clients. 
 Both sides appealed the preliminary injunction.  As appellate counsel, the Associated 
Press engaged none other than Peter Stenger Grosscup himself, author of the National Telegraph 
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News opinion, who had resigned from his Seventh Circuit judgeship in 1911.179  In a split 
decision, the Second Circuit, citing National Telegraph News with approval,180 extended the 
preliminary injunction to cover copying of Associated Press news even when it was procured 
from publicly available newspapers.  Judge Charles Merrill Hough’s opinion directly addressed 
the issue of whether news content was copyrightable, and embraced a creativity-based view of 
originality: “It may be granted that . . . publication at common law terminated an author’s rights 
in his manuscript and the fruits of his brain; yet it still remains true that plaintiff’s property in 
news is not literary at all, that it is not capable of copyright, and that ‘publication,’ as that word is 
used in the long line of decisions regarding literary rights, has no determinative bearing on this 
case.”181 
 When the case reached the Supreme Court, it split the Justices six to three, but not on the 
issue whether copyright law incorporated a creativity-based originality requirement.  For the 
majority, Justice Pitney concluded that “the news element – the information respecting current 
events contained in the literary production – is not the creation of the writer,”182 and therefore 
was not copyrightable.  Justice Pitney echoed concerns expressed in both the Newspaper 
Copyright Bill debates and the National Telegraph News decision about granting exclusive rights 
over “the history of the day.”183  The framers of the Constitution, he argued, could not have 
“intended to confer upon one who might happen to be the first to report a historic event the 
exclusive right for any period to spread the knowledge of it.”184   In dissent, Justice Brandeis 
expressed similar support for a creativity-based originality standard that would exclude factual 
matter.  “[I]ntellectual productions, he contended, “are entitled to such protection only if there is 
underneath something evincing the mind of a creator or originator, however modest the 
requirement. The mere record of isolated happenings . . . are denied such protection.”185  In 
support, he cited, among other cases, National Telegraph News.186  Justice Holmes’s separate 
dissent did not touch directly on the issue, but he could be safely counted on the side of 
creativity-based originality as well, since his statement in the 1903 case of Bleistein v. 
Donaldson Lithographing Co.187 is a crystalline expression of that view: “The copy is the 
personal reaction of an individual upon nature. . . a very modest grade of art has in it something 
irreducible, which is one man's alone. That something he may copyright . . . .”188 
 
                                                 
179 See Associated Press v. International News Service, 245 F. 244, 247 (2d Cir. 1917) (listing Peter S. Grosscup as 
lead counsel for plaintiffs); Federal Judicial Center, Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/hisj (entry for “Grosscup, Peter Stenger” notes that he resigned on October 23, 
1911). 
180 See Associated Press v. International News Service, 245 F. 244, 249 (2d Cir. 1917). 
181 Id. at 250. 
182 International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234 (1918). 
183 Id. 
184 Id.  Of course, Pitney’s remark can be criticized as a “straw man” overstatement.  No one has ever contended that 
copyright law would grant someone exclusive rights over news because he was the first to report it.  Even under a 
broad view of copyright protection, anyone would still be free to report the news if he had a source for it that was 
independent of the first reporter.  Even with that correction, however, Pitney can still be seen as expressing the 
concern that a person or organization would be able to monopolize a news story when there was no independent 
source, and that there were likely to be many cases in which no independent source could be found.  
185 Id. at 254 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
186 Id. at 254 n. 6. 
187 188 U.S. 239 (1903). 
188 Id. at 250. 
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 As an experiment in common-law protection of intellectual property, International News 
Service v. Associated Press can probably be counted as a failure.  It has not spawned a broad 
jurisprudence of common-law intellectual property, but has been given a narrow reading, limited 
to “hot news” misappropriation;189 and its views on federal court jurisdiction have been 
thoroughly repudiated.190  As the statement of a view of originality that excludes independently 
created factual accounts from copyright protection, however, it can be counted as a success.  
Although some post-INS courts continued to protect compilations of facts without a showing of 
creative selection or arrangement, the Supreme Court eventually vindicated INS in Feist 
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co, Inc.191  Thus, the debate over copyright in 
news, beginning with the Newspaper Copyright Bill in 1884 and continuing through the National 
Telegraph News case, resulted in the rise of a creativity-based model of originality that received 
unanimous Supreme Court approval in 1918 and has only been strengthened and broadened by 
Feist.  
V. Lessons from the Newspaper Copyright Debate 
What can we learn from the debate over copyright in news, and the transformation of 
originality doctrine in that debate?   
First, it is a reminder that although copyright doctrines and rationales may be framed at 
high levels of abstraction, they are likely to enjoy success only under a much more particular set 
of conditions, and those conditions are likely to change over time.  Nineteenth-century judges 
and commentators articulated a view of copyright originality under which factual matter was 
entitled to copyright protection; those who wanted to sell works that imparted information were 
exhorted to go out and gather it themselves, rather than free-ride on the intellectual labor of those 
who had already gathered it.  Yet while that view is stated in general enough terms to make it 
applicable to news and news-gathering, the view became settled orthodoxy without ever being 
tested within the news industry, because at that time the news industry had no interest in 
protection for news.  Once it gained such an interest, the intellectual labor theory was severely 
strained, because news, as it functioned within late-nineteenth-century American culture, did not 
fit the presuppositions of that theory very well.  Witnessing a current event seemed to many to be 
as much a matter of chance as of labor and investment.  News often came in narrative form, 
which allowed for a greater distinction between form and content than was possible with 
directories and maps.  News seemed to be of more immediate political and cultural importance, 
and its free dissemination seemed particularly important when non-local news gathering was 
dominated by a very small number of large organizations. Moreover, “market substitute” 
infringement doctrine had much less maneuvering space to mediate between the economic 
interests of copyright owners and the interest in free dissemination when individual news items 
could become the selling points for newspaper issues, and could become independent works in 
the continuous stream of the news ticker.    
                                                 
189 See, e.g., National Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997). 
190 See, e.g., McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 1993) (INS v. AP “no longer is legally authoritative because 
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191 499 U.S. 340 (1991).  But see Jane C. Ginsburg, No “Sweat”? Copyright and Other Protection of Works of 
Information After Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 338, 352 (1992) (“Nonetheless, judicial inclination 
to reprimand sweat theft remains strong.”). 
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Second, the news copyright debate demonstrates the interdependence of the myriad 
doctrines that constitute copyright law.  It is not particularly surprising that the “country press,” 
which was opposed to any form of protection for news, advanced a creativity-based view of the 
originality requirement under which news matter was not copyrightable.  Yet under copyright 
law as it existed at the turn of the twentieth century, the Western Union, which strongly desired 
protection for its news items, decided that it also wanted to advance a creativity-based view of 
originality, because its news ticker service could not satisfy the formalities of registration and 
notice; better to argue that news was outside of the reach of copyright altogether, and could 
therefore still qualify for common-law protection. 
The removal of news content from copyright – a contraction of copyright protection 
along the dimension of copyrightable subject matter – may also have made it easier for copyright 
to expand along other dimensions.  If copyright was going to focus less on news, and more on 
fiction and entertainment, then the opposition to increases in scope of protection, such as 
protection of derivative works, and in length of copyright term, would decrease.  This continues 
to be relevant to the current debate about whether patent and copyright law should have special 
rules for each industry that avails itself of patent or copyright protection.192  It remains to be seen 
whether tailoring is a useful tool to ensure that each industry receives protection at a level that is 
optimal for society as a whole, or is an opportunity for each industry to ensure that as much  
market surplus as possible is captured by producers rather than consumers. 
One important issue that cannot be completely resolved within the scope of this article is 
the fate of the distinction between news reports, on the one hand, and other fact-based works like 
directories and maps, on the other.  If, indeed, news reports posed different issues than 
directories and maps, thus requiring a rethinking of prevailing originality doctrine, why doesn’t 
copyright law continue to distinguish between them?  Why did the Feist Court end up treating 
them all the same, with a broad, sweeping statement about the non-copyrightability of facts?  
There is certainly more work to be done on this issue, but perhaps the reader will indulge a few 
preliminary observations.  First, the distinction persisted for decades, albeit somewhat 
inconsistently given the number of federal courts involved and the confusion in the law.  
Important lower courts, such as the Second Circuit, gave notice that in spite of INS v. AP they 
were sticking to the view that the copyright in directories was not limited to creative selection 
and arrangement.193  Second, the argument against copyright in news that had the most 
immediate and simplest intuitive appeal – that reporters did not create the facts that they 
documented – had implications beyond news, and those implications were difficult to ignore.  
Third, the Copyright Act did not provide a strong textual hook for maintaining such a distinction.  
Interestingly, the Berne Convention, the drafting of which began in 1884 – the same year as the 
Newspaper Copyright Bill – contemplated that its signatories would treat news differently.  It 
provided for a default rule of free copying of news stories, another sign that the custom of news 
copying was not confined to the United States.194  Yet if the United States never adopted special 
                                                 
192 See, e.g., Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual Property Law, 55 Am. 
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statutory protection for news stories, it never adopted a special exclusion for them either, and 
that made it difficult to maintain a distinction. 
Thus, all that remains is to reiterate the main thesis of this article.  An intellectual-labor-
based view of originality, and of the scope of copyright protection, developed during an era 
when the news industry was uninterested in copyright.  When major news industry players 
became interested in protection for news, due to technological and social changes that reshaped 
that industry, debate about the appropriateness and shape of that protection in Congress and the 
courts gave a substantial boost to a creativity-based view of originality that grew in dominance 
during the 20th century and today is established orthodoxy. 
                                                                                                                                                             
articles that discussed political matters or news of the day.  It was not until the Stockholm Conference in 1967 that 
this default blanket license provision was deleted; the current text contains one vestige of the original provision, the 
statement in Article 2(8) that “The Protection of the Convention shall not apply to news of the day or to 
miscellaneous facts having the character of mere items of press information.”  See Sam Ricketson, The Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works: 1886-1986 302-06 (1987). 
